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I confirm that an earlier version of Chapter 2, “The Interaction Between Conventional Monetary 
Policy and Financial Stability: Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK”, was initially 
published as REM Working Paper No. 096-2019, and finally as Venter, Z. (2020). “The 
Interaction Between Conventional Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Chile, Colombia, 
Japan, Portugal and the UK”, Comparative Economic Studies (2020) 62:521–554. 
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and Financial Stability”, was published as REM Working Paper No. 0123-2020, and finally as 













By focusing on the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy for the cases 
of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK, this thesis aims to add to the existing literature 
on the fundamental issue of the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy, a 
traditional topic that gained importance in the aftermath of the GFC as Central Banks lowered 
policy rates in an effort to rescue their economies.  As the zero-lower bound loomed and the 
reach of traditional monetary policy narrowed, policy makers realised that alternative 
frameworks were needed and hence, macroprudential policy measures aimed at targeting the 
financial system as a whole were introduced.   
 
The second chapter looks at the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability, 
which has gained importance in recent years as Central Bank policy rates neared the zero-lower 
bound.  We use an SVAR model to study the impact of monetary policy shocks on three proxies 
for financial stability as well as a proxy for economic growth. Monetary policy is represented 
by policy rates for the EMEs and shadow rates for the AEs in our chapter.  Our main results 
show that monetary policy may be used to correct asset mispricing, to control fluctuations in 
the real business cycle and also to tame credit cycles in the majority of cases. Our results also 
show that for the majority of cases, in line with theory, local currencies appreciate following a 
positive monetary policy shock.  Monetary policy intervention may indeed be successful in 
contributing to or achieving financial stability.  However, the results show that monetary policy 
may not have the ability to maintain or re-establish financial stability in all cases.  Alternative 
policy choices such as macroprudential policy tool frameworks which are aimed at targeting 
the financial system as a whole may be implemented as a means of fortifying the economy.
 
The third chapter looks at the institutional setting of the countries in question, the independence 





stability. I substantiate the literature review discussion with a brief empirical analysis of the 
effect of Central Bank Independence on credit growth using an existing database created by 
Romelli (2018).  The empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between credit 
growth and the level of Central Bank Independence (CBI) due to the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction term between growth in domestic credit to the private 
sector and the level of CBI. When considering domestic credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant for the 
case of the UK for the third regression equation. A number of robustness checks show that the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for a number of cases when implementing a 
variety of estimation methods. Fluctuations in credit growth are larger for higher levels of CBI 
and hence, in periods of financial instability or ultimately financial crises, CBI would be reined 
back in an effort to re-establish financial stability.  Based on the empirical results, and in an 
effort to slow down surging credit supply and to maintain financial stability, policy makers and 
governmental authorities should attempt to decrease the level of CBI when the economy shows 
signs of overheating and credit supply continues to increase. 
 
The fourth chapter looks at the interaction between macroprudential policy and financial 
stability.  The unexpected interconnectedness of the global economy and the economic blight 
that occurred as a result of this, recapitulated the need to implement an alternative policy 
framework aimed at targeting the financial system as a whole and hence, targeting the 
maintenance of financial stability.  In this chapter, an index of domestic macroprudential policy 
tools is constructed and the effectiveness of these tools in controlling credit growth, managing 
GDP growth and stabilising inflation growth is studied using a dynamic panel data model for 
the period between 2000 and 2017.  The empirical analysis includes two panels namely an EU 
panel of 27 countries and a Latin American panel of 7 countries, the chapter also looks at a case 
study of Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Our main results find that a tighter macroprudential policy 
tool stance leads to a decrease in both credit growth and GDP growth while, a tighter 
macroprudential policy tool stance results in higher inflation in the majority of cases.  Further, 
we find that capital openness plays a more important role in the case of Latin America, this may 
be due to the region’s dependence on foreign capital flows and exchange rate movements.  
Lastly, we find that, in times of higher perceived market volatility, GDP growth tends to be 
higher and inflation growth tends to be lower in the EU.  In the other cases, higher levels of 





growth.  This is in line with expectations as an increase in perceived market volatility is met 
with an increased flow of assets into safer markets such as the EU. 
 
This thesis establishes a relationship between financial stability and monetary policy by 
studying the response of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK in the aftermath of the 
GFC as Central Banks lowered policy rates in an effort to rescue their economies. In short, the 
results of the work conducted in this thesis may be summarised as follows.  Our results show 
that monetary policy contributes to the achievement of financial stability.  Still, monetary policy 
alone is not sufficient and should be reinforced by less traditional policy choices such as 
macroprudential policy tools.  Secondly, we find that the level of CBI should be reined in in 
times of surging credit supply in an effort to maintain financial stability.  Finally, we conclude 
that macroprudential policy tools play an important role in the achievement of financial 
stability.  These tools should complement traditional monetary policy frameworks and should 
be adapted for each region. 
 
JEL Classification: E52, E58, F42, F55, G01 
Keywords: Central Bank Independence, Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, 
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ADF  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
AEs  Advanced Economies 
AIC  Akaike Information Criterion 
BCCH  Banco Central de Chile 
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CWN  Cukierman et al. (1992) Central Bank Independence Index 
DSGE  Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
DSTI  Debt-service-to-income 
EC  European Commission 
ECB  European Central Bank 
ECBI  Extended Central Bank Independence
EFTA  European Free Trade Agreement
EMEs  Emerging Market Economies 
ERM  European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
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ESM  European Stability Mechanism 
EU  European Union 
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IPI  Industrial Production Index 
LDP  Liberal Democratic Party 
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MPC  Monetary Policy Committee 
PRA  Prudential Regulation Authority 
SBIC   Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion 
SVAR  Structural Vector Autoregressive Model 
UK  United Kingdom 
UP  Unión Patriótica 
US   United States 
VAR  Vector Autoregressive Model 
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On 14 September 2008, the GFC reached an exigent point when Lehman Brothers, the fourth 
largest investment bank in the US at the time, filed for bankruptcy.  The GFC followed a period 
of considerable deregulation in the US with a notable policy change being the replacement of 
The Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1993) by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999)1.  The ‘Shadow Banking’ system, banks and financial 
institutions played a pivotal role in the collapse of the economy during the GFC as the majority 
of financial institutions believed in the ‘too big to fail’ notion and subsequently continued to 
increase leverage, risk and the percentage of assets lent.   ‘Shadow Banks’ increased the 
availability of credit in circulation and the inability of regulators to provide adequate regulation 
to control the ‘Shadow Banking’ system ultimately resulted in both the collapse of the economy 
as well as a breakdown of trust in the financial sector. 
 
The damage caused by the financial crisis was not contained in the US and instead the financial 
and economic contagion spread like wildfire through global economies.  Debt levels in many 
European countries burgeoned and countries relying on commodity exportation or the 
exportation of manufactured products namely, Latin American countries and Japan 
respectively, were impacted by the weaker US dollar and the drop in external demand.  It 
became evident to policy makers and national governments that an improved policy framework 
was needed and that a larger, more defined focus on financial stability and system wide 
 
1 The convergence of corporate bank activities and investment bank activities blurred the lines between the two 
branches and made regulation of these entities more challenging.  




weaknesses needed to be included in this new framework.  Central Banks play a vital role in 
the functioning and success of the global economy as well as in the achievement of financial 
stability.  The political environment determines, to some extent, the policy frameworks that are 
implemented and also determines the attitude with which the public accepts proposed policy 
changes and hence, their willingness to adapt.  The political environment also determines, in 
many cases, the level of CBI, as history has shown in the cases of both the UK and Portugal.  
The independence of Central Banks and the stability and openness of the political system, in 
turn, determines the independence of monetary policy decisions and hence, has an effect on the 
policy frameworks in place, both unconventional and conventional.  The study of these factors 
and the effect on financial stability is of paramount importance as we move forward into a more 
interconnected world where boundaries, both economic and geographic, become obsolete.    
 
This thesis discusses the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy and aims 
to analyse the ability of monetary policy to achieve financial stability and the role of Central 
Banks and the political environment in achieving financial stability. Finally, this thesis analyses 
the ability of unconventional monetary policy tools namely, macroprudential policy tools, to 
achieve financial stability.  This thesis focuses on five country cases namely, Chile, Colombia, 
Japan, Portugal and the UK.  The countries chosen are by no means assumed to be a 
representative group and instead, the countries are analysed on a case by case basis throughout 
the thesis.  The five countries chosen for analysis all have autonomous, inflation targeting 
Central Banks, which provides the opportunity for more independent monetary policy 
decisions, this also places the countries in question on equal footing when considering the 
methodology used to analyse the cases.   
 
Both Colombia and Chile adopted inflation targeting frameworks at the turn of the century 
which subsequently resulted in a heightened interest in the monetary policy mechanism in these 
countries. A lack of empirical studies due to limited data availability, the implementation of a 
series of structural reforms, improved economic openness as well as a long history of political 
instability presents an interesting opportunity for a case study.  The decreased demand as well 
as plummeting prices of copper and oil in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic poses a 
significant risk to these two EMEs and hence, they are included in the analysis.  The “three 
arrows” of the new Japanese economic policy (known as Abenomics) was implemented in 
2012, the reception of which has been mixed. Although this economic framework seems to 




have been somewhat successful, the Japanese economy is still toiling against deflation and 
sluggish growth, which combined with the COVID-19 crisis, resulted in Japan entering a 
recession in May 2020.  The world’s third largest economy continues to be plagued by both 
economic and social risks and hence, the studying the financial stability of this economy as well 
as the comprising elements is fundamental.   
 
Although Portuguese monetary policy is determined by the objectives of the ECB, studying the 
financial stability of the country as well as the implementation and success of monetary policy 
tools is of importance when considering Portugal’s noteworthy economic recovery following a 
bailout from the EU in the aftermath of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.  Portugal’s position 
as an EU periphery country, the slightly removed geographical position as well as the influx of 
foreign investment and expat arrivals over the past few years makes a compelling case in favour 
of the study of the case of Portugal.  Lastly, the UK dilemma in the midst of political uncertainty 
in the face of unending Brexit negotiations and the economic uncertainty related to this as the 
UK welcomes their third Prime Minister since 2016 and their second attempt at a Brexit deal 
justifies the study of the UK.  The uncommonly restricted economic activity during the COVID-
19 pandemic, the unbridled pressure on financial resources and the excessive strain on 
governmental infrastructure will no doubt have a disastrously significant impact on the global 
economy and in particular, on both the Portuguese and the UK economies. 
 
The second chapter of this thesis studies the relationship between financial stability and 
monetary policy.  A number of studies using an SVAR model have been conducted on the US, 
the UK, Japan and the EU.  However, due to a lack of data availability as well as a series of 
structural reforms having taken place in Latin American economies, SVAR methodology has 
not been used frequently to perform econometric studies focusing on this region.  Similarly to 
Cocriş and Nucu (2013), the second chapter employs an SVAR model to study the impact of 
monetary policy, short term policy rates in the case of EMEs and shadow rates in the case of 
AEs, on three proxies for financial stability namely, credit growth (Cocriş and Nucu (2013) 
focuses on loan-to-deposit ratios), stock prices and the exchange rate.  The impact of short term 
policy rates on economic growth is also studied with industrial production being included as a 
proxy for the real sector.   
 




The main results show that monetary policy may be used to correct asset mispricing due to the 
inverse relationship between the level of the stock market index and the monetary policy rate 
when considering the cases of Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  In line with theory, the 
results show that the local currency appreciates in both the short run and the long run following 
a monetary policy rate shock when considering the cases of Chile, Portugal and Japan while, 
the local currency depreciates when considering the cases of Colombia and the UK.  Theory 
would suggest that a positive monetary policy shock would result in a local currency 
appreciation in countries with a floating exchange rate regime in place as foreign investors 
chase a higher interest rate for their asset investments.  Colombia’s reliance on commodity 
exportation may be the reasoning behind the currency depreciation following a positive policy 
rate shock while, the currency depreciation in the case of the UK is in line with earlier literature 
including, Caglayan et al. (2011) and is attributed to uncertainty in the local market. 
 
The inverse relationship between credit supply and monetary policy when considering the cases 
of Chile and the UK and the inverse relationship between the level of the industrial production 
index and monetary policy shocks when considering the cases of Colombia, Japan and Portugal 
shows that monetary policy may be used to tame credit cycles and control fluctuations in the 
real business cycle.  A number of robustness checks are included in an effort to validate our 
main findings.  The results of these robustness checks show that, in line with the main results, 
monetary policy may indeed be used to correct asset mispricing and to control fluctuations in 
credit supply and hence, monetary policy may effectively contribute to the maintenance of or 
achievement of financial stability.  In spite of this, the results show that monetary policy may 
not have the ability to maintain or re-establish financial stability in all cases hence, alternative 
policy choices such as macroprudential policy tool frameworks may need to be implemented to 
complement more traditional policy frameworks. 
 
The third chapter of this thesis looks at the role of Central Banks and the political environment 
in achieving financial stability.  The chapter first describes the institutional structure and 
institutional environment in two Latin American countries namely, Chile and Colombia, two 
EU members namely, the UK and Portugal, and one Asian country namely, Japan.  I then look 
at the structure, functioning and the history of the Central Banks in these countries as well as 
the political environment and go on to look at the financial stability of these countries from a 




literature point of view.  Lastly, I conduct an empirical analysis to study the effect of CBI on 
credit growth using a database created by Romelli (2018).    
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between the growth 
in domestic credit to the private sector and the level of the ECBI index, for the cases of the UK 
and Portugal for the second regression indicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
growth in domestic credit to the private sector and CBI.  The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction term between the growth in domestic credit by deposit 
banks and other financial institutions and the level of Central Bank Independence when 
considering the cases of Chile, Portugal and the UK for the second regression and the case of 
the UK for the third regression equation confirms that, in a few cases, there is a positive 
relationship between domestic credit growth and the level of Central Bank Independence.  A 
number of robustness checks are included in Appendices, these robustness checks confirm that 
the coefficient on the interaction term between credit growth and the level of CBI is indeed 
positive and statistically significant in a number of cases when implementing a variety of 
estimation methods as well as in the cases where domestic credit is replaced by private credit 
measures.  The results indicate that a positive relationship between credit growth and the level 
of CBI exists in a number of cases, most noticeably and consistently for the cases of the two 
EU countries. 
 
In the cases where there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction 
term between credit growth and the level of CBI, fluctuations in credit growth are larger for 
higher levels of CBI.  The results therefore show that in periods of financial instability, CBI 
would be reined back in an effort to re-establish financial stability.  In light of these results, 
policy makers and governmental authorities (particularly those in the UK and Portugal) should 
decrease the level of CBI in times of surging credit supply and an overheating economy in an 
effort to mitigate credit supply surges and ultimately, to re-establish financial stability.    
 
The fourth chapter looks at the interaction between macroprudential policy and financial 
stability in times of uncertainty.  The study looks at the impact of macroprudential policy tool 
implementation on three veins of financial stability for both a panel of 27 EU countries and a 
panel of 7 Latin American countries.  Three case studies are also included looking at the cases 
of Japan, Portugal and the UK.  A monthly index of domestic macroprudential policy tools 




constructed by Alam et al. (2019), the iMaPP database, is used as a starting point for the index 
used in the fourth chapter.  The iMaPP database is coded through 2016:Q4, I then cross checked 
this index with the Cerutti et al. (2017) index and went on to extend this cross checked version 
of the index using the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey and the IMF Data Query report.  The 
monthly index is cumulated to create the final quarterly database used in this chapter as the 
majority of variables available for the analysis, in particular the level of credit, are available 
quarterly. 
 
The main results of the fourth chapter show that, a tighter macroprudential policy tool stance 
would lead to a decrease in credit growth as well as lower GDP growth while, a tighter stance 
would lead to higher inflation in the majority of cases.  Additionally, capital openness plays a 
more important role in the case of Latin America, this may be due to the region’s dependence 
on foreign capital flows and exchange rate movements.  Finally, our results show that, in times 
of higher perceived market volatility, GDP growth tends to be higher and inflation growth tends 
to be lower in the EU.  In the other cases, higher levels of perceived market volatility result in 
higher inflation, higher credit growth and lower GDP growth.  This is in line with expectations 
as an increase in perceived market volatility is met with an increased flow of assets into safer 
markets such as the EU. 
 
This thesis aims to add to the existing literature on the fundamental issue of the relationship 
between financial stability and monetary policy, a traditional topic that gained importance in 
the aftermath of the GFC as Central Banks lowered policy rates in an effort to rescue their 
economies.  As the zero-lower bound loomed and the reach of traditional monetary policy 
frameworks narrowed, policy makers realised that alternative policy frameworks were needed 
and hence, macroprudential policy tools aimed at targeting the financial system as a whole were 
introduced.  This thesis looks at a number of components that are thought to contribute to 
financial stability and analyses the relationship between both the more conventional policy 
frameworks implemented prior to the GFC as well as the unconventional policy frameworks 
implemented in the period after the GFC namely, macroprudential policy tools, and financial 
stability.  In short, the results of the work conducted in this thesis may be summarised as 
follows.  Firstly, although monetary policy contributes to the achievement of financial stability, 
it may not have the ability to fully maintain financial stability and alternative, less traditional 
policy choices such as macroprudential policy tools may need to be implemented in an effort 




to fully achieve or maintain financial stability.  Secondly, the level of CBI should be reined in 
in times of surging credit supply in an effort to re-establish financial stability.  Finally, 
macroprudential policy frameworks may indeed be the solution to the problem at hand and 
although targeted macroprudential prudential policy tools should be implemented based on the 
region, these tools may be successful in achieving financial stability when used in a 












The Interaction Between Monetary Policy and Financial 
Stability 




The relationship between monetary policy and financial stability became an important topic in 
the aftermath of the 2008-2009 GFC as Central Banks lowered their policy rates in an effort to 
revive the economy and the zero-lower bound loomed3. Traditionally, price stability has been 
the main objective of Central Banks and therefore, of monetary policy. However, the crisis 
emphasized the need to implement alternative measures and to expand the scope of monetary 
policy to include a focus on the maintenance of financial stability while maintaining the primary 
objective of achieving price stability. Kryvstov et al. (2015) discuss the relationship between 
financial and macroeconomic conditions.  They note that financial stability conditions are an 
important part of monetary policy implementation as financial stability is a precondition for a 
well-functioning financial system.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial 
stability for the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Monetary policy 
 
2 Published: Venter, Z. (2020). “The Interaction Between Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Chile, 
Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK”, Comparative Economic Studies (2020) 62:521–554. 
3 Advanced economies had limited options to further reduce policy rates and hence, employed unconventional 
monetary policy tools such as quantitative easing.   





influences the amount of money in circulation in the economy as well as the borrowing cost of 
money. The countries chosen have autonomous, inflation targeting Central Banks, which
provides the opportunity for more independent monetary policy decisions.  In the case of 
Colombia and Chile, this combined with a lack of empirical studies due to limited data 
availability makes for an interesting case study.  The UK dilemma following a tumultuous 
period of Brexit negotiations and uncertainty topped off by growing economic and social 
uncertainty and loss in the midst of the current COVID-19 pandemic and Japan’s unending 
battle with deflation and sluggish growth justifies the study of the UK and Japan.  Lastly, 
although Portuguese monetary policy is determined by the objectives of the European Central 
Bank, the effect on credit growth in Portugal is noteworthy considering Portugal’s recent 
economic recovery following a bailout from the troika formed by the EC, ECB and the IMF.  
The potential impact of the current global pandemic on the newly recovered Portuguese 
economy solidifies the need to study the case of Portugal.  The five countries are looked at on 
a case by case basis with the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial stability being 
studied for each individual country case.    
 
A decade after the GFC, financial stability and the effective implementation of monetary policy 
remains a priority for many Central Banks.  Studying the relationship between monetary policy 
and financial stability, in particular, the effect on different areas of potential vulnerability, may 
play an important role in future targeted policy decisions.  A number of SVAR analyses have 
been conducted on the US Economy as well as other advanced economies. However, due to 
shorter time series caused by limited data availability as well as structural reforms in Latin 
American countries, SVARs have not been used frequently in econometric studies.  SVAR 
models based on the VAR approach suggested by Sims (1980) have been used frequently in 
Japan, Portugal and the UK with four available examples being Nakahira (2009), Afonso and 
Sousa (2011, 2012) and Elbourne (2008) respectively.  In this chapter, an SVAR is employed 
and impulse response functions are used in an effort to test the impact of monetary policy on 
financial stability. As in Cocriş and Nucu (2013), the impact of short term interest rates on three 
proxies for financial stability namely, credit growth, stock prices and the exchange rate is 
studied. Industrial production is included as a proxy for the real sector and hence, for economic 
growth.  In line with Cocriş and Nucu (2013), policy rates are used to represent monetary policy 





choices in emerging economies.  Shadow rates are used to represent monetary policy 
intervention in advanced economies.   
 
Our main results show that monetary policy may be used to correct asset mispricing due to the 
inverse relationship between monetary policy intervention and the stock market index for four 
of the five cases namely, the cases of Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Conventional 
wisdom4 suggests that contractionary monetary policy would result in a currency appreciation 
in countries with a floating exchange rate regime as foreign investment is attracted.  The results 
show that the exchange rate appreciates following a monetary policy shock for the cases of 
Chile, Japan and Portugal while the currency depreciates for the cases of Colombia and the UK.  
The currency depreciation in the case of Colombia could be attributed to the country’s reliance 
on exports as Colombia relies heavily on commodity exportation while, in the case of the UK, 
this depreciation is attributed to uncertainty in the local market.  
 
The results also show that monetary policy may be used to limit fluctuations in the real business 
cycle as can be seen by the inverse relationship between the industrial production index and 
monetary policy intervention in the majority of cases namely, for the cases of Colombia, Japan 
and Portugal.  Credit growth also has an inverse relationship with monetary policy intervention 
in the cases of Chile and the UK.  Ergo, monetary policy may be used to tame credit cycles.  In 
the cases of Colombia, Japan and Portugal, credit moves in the same direction as monetary 
policy intervention.  Thus, positive monetary policy shock results in an increase in credit.  The 
results show that monetary policy intervention as represented by policy rates and shadow rates 
may indeed be able to contribute to financial stability.  The results show that monetary policy 
may not have the ability to maintain or re-establish financial stability in all cases.  Alternative 
policy choices such as macroprudential policy tools aimed at targeting the financial system as 
a whole may be useful to reinforce the monetary policy framework. 
 
The rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 2 surveys existing literature; Section 3 discusses 
the methodology and the data used; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
4 See Inoue and Rossi (2019), Clarida and Galí (1994), Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Faust and Rogers 
(2003). 





2.2. Literature Review 
Financial instability is defined as a situation in which the economic performance of an economy 
is potentially affected by price fluctuations of financial assets (Crockett, 1997).  In this chapter, 
three proxies for financial stability are included, the first being credit growth which is looked 
at in existing literature.  For example, Jiménez et al. (2012) look at the impact of monetary 
policy on the supply of credit.  They show that tighter monetary policy and weaker economic 
conditions substantially reduce loan granting, in particular loan granting by banks with lower 
capital or liquidity ratios.  In this chapter, we find that tighter monetary policy results in reduced 
credit growth in Chile and the UK and increased credit growth in Colombia, Japan and Portugal.  
Jiménez et al. (2012) also note that the GFC showed that the use of monetary policy rates as a 
means of supporting credit growth seems advisable.  Further, Allen and Gale (2007), Schularick 
and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and Borio (2014) find that credit growth 
fluctuations are a common forerunner of financial crises5.  Also, Jorda et al. (2013) show that 
excess credit growth in the period prior to a peak is usually associated with a more severe 
recession and Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) note that crises are 
often accompanied by bank credit crunches and halting foreign capital flows.  Given the 
importance of credit growth as a harbinger of crises as well as an indicator of the magnitude of 
crises, the study of the relationship between credit growth and monetary policy intervention as 
represented by policy rates for emerging economies and shadow rates for advanced economies 
is of importance.  
 
Our second proxy for financial stability is the exchange rate, the inclusion of which is 
substantiated by existing literature.  For example, exchange rate depreciation is used as a proxy 
for financial vulnerability in both Eichengreen and Gupta (2015) as well as Park et al. (2016).   
Further, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) make use of a VAR analysis to investigate the effect of 
shocks (in monetary policy) on exchange rates in the US and find that contractionary monetary 
policy results in a long-lasting appreciation in the exchange rate.  Our results show that tighter 
monetary policy results in an appreciation of the local currency in Chile, Japan and Portugal.  
However, the local currency in the UK and Colombia depreciates.  Dhrymes and Dimitros 
(1997) look at more economically compatible SVAR models, they find that foreign interest 
 
5 These results are in line with Jorda et al. (2011), Drehmann et al. (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012). 





rates and the real exchange rate are determinants of real output.  Lastly, Cavallari (2001) finds 
that monetary shocks have no effect on real variables in the long run when considering a SVAR.  
In contrast, Lee and Chinn (2002) extended this model to include exchange rate data and found 
that monetary policy does indeed influence exchange rates. 
 
Our final proxy for financial stability is the growth in the stock market which is looked at in 
earlier literature.  Granville and Mallick (2009) use stock prices, exchange rates and loan-to-
deposit ratios as proxies for financial stability and define financial stability in terms of changes 
in stock prices6.  Asiriyan et al. (2019) consider monetary policy in a bubbly world where low 
interest rates result in frequent booms and busts in asset prices.  Both monetary policy and 
bubbles have expansionary effects on the economy with bubbles having both an overhang effect 
as well as a wealth effect7.  In line with Asiriyan et al. (2019), we find that tighter monetary 
policy results in lower stock prices except in the case of Chile.  Both Granville and Mallick 
(2009) and Cocriş and Nucu (2013) define financial stability in terms of the change in the share 
price, the exchange rate as the units of local currency per unit of Euro and the loan-to-deposit 
ratio.  Cocriş and Nucu (2013) find that in countries with inflation targeting schemes, the 
interest rate instrument facilitates financial stability while, in countries with fixed exchange 
rates, monetary policy does not encourage financial stability except in the case of Bulgaria. 
Lastly, we include industrial production as a proxy for the real business cycle in line with Cocriş 
and Nucu (2013), Grilli and Roubini (1996), Kim (2001) and Kim and Roubini (2000). 
 
Today, the Chilean Central Bank maintains one of the highest levels of Central Bank 
independence globally and maintains a successful inflation targeting framework.  Colombia is 
currently Latin America’s second largest economy, has a stable currency, an abundance of 
natural resources, a somewhat stable political system and is seen as one of the greatest success 
stories globally over the past three decades.  Chile is the largest producer of copper globally 
and Colombia’s biggest export is oil; the currently decreased demand as well as plummeting 
prices in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic poses a significant risk to both economies.  
These two countries have been overlooked in empirical research, much like other Latin 
 
6 Ouhibi and Hammami (2015) define financial stability in the same way.   
7 The overhang effect refers to resources being moved away from investment and the wealth effect refers to 
bubbles reducing the cost of intermediation. 





American countries, for a multitude of reasons including the lack of data availability.  However, 
the adoption of inflation-targeting regimes in the late 1990s has sparked an interest in the 
monetary policy mechanism.  SVAR models have been used to study both monetary policy 
(Catão and Pagan (2011), Parrado (2001)) and fiscal policy (Restrepo and Rincon (2006)) in 
Chile and Colombia.  However, the number of papers implementing this methodology and 
focusing on the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability is still somewhat 
limited.  Japan, the world’s third largest economy, is still toiling against lifelong employment, 
declining exports, strict immigration policies and stagflation all of which has been further 
amplified by the current global pandemic; this recently resulted in the country slipping into a 
recession.  Earlier literature studying Japanese monetary policy using an SVAR model includes 
Nakahira (2009), Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) and Yano and Yoshino (2008). 
 
The Portuguese recovery in the aftermath of the Sovereign Debt Crisis is arguably the greatest 
success story in Southern Europe to date.  Economically, Brexit has worsened investor 
confidence, resulted in weakened economic growth, higher debt levels and lower living 
standards.  Politically, the UK has had three prime ministers in as many years which has resulted 
in stop-and-start Brexit negotiations and political disquietude.  The uncommonly restricted 
economic activity in the midst of the current COVID-19 pandemic, the unbridled pressure on 
financial resources and the excessive strain on governmental infrastructure will no doubt have 
a disastrously significant impact on the global economy and in particular, on both the 
Portuguese and the UK economies.  SVAR models have been used to study monetary policy in 
earlier research focusing on the UK (Elbourne (2008) and Caglayan et al. (2011)) and both 
monetary policy and fiscal policy in Portugal (Sousa (2014), Afonso and Silva (2019) and 
Afonso and Sousa (2011)).   
 
2.3. Methodology and Data 
Hurwicz (1962) explains that a structural model is one in which the impact of ‘interventions’8 
is predicted. This chapter makes use of a SVAR model to identify the impact of interest rate 
policy on financial stability. I apply this methodology to the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, 
Portugal and the UK.  
 
8 “Deliberate policy actions, or changes in the economy or in the nature of known types.” (Sims, 2002) 






Our starting point for the analysis is an SVAR model of order p (SVAR(p)).   
 
The SVAR model is as follows: 
𝐵0𝑋𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝐵1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑋𝑡−2 +…+ 𝐵𝑝𝑋𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑈𝑡     (1) 
 
𝑈𝑡 is a multivariate white noise process with variance/covariance matrix D and represents the 
structural innovations, 𝐵𝑖 and D are (K x K) matrices, c contains K elements where K is the 
number of variables with i = 0, …, p.  There are K(K-1)/2 restrictions on 𝐵0 and in the case 
where 𝐵0 is being lower triangular, there are K(K+1)/2 unknowns in the matrix. 
 
When 𝐵0 is invertible, equation (1) is equivalent to equation (2) which represents a reduced 
form VAR(p):   
𝑋𝑡 = 𝜙0 + ∑ Φ𝑙 𝑋𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝
𝑙=1     (2) 
 
where Xt is a (K x 1) vector of endogenous variables, 𝜙0 is a (K x 1) vector of intercepts, Φ𝑙 
are (K x K) coefficient matrices and 𝜀𝑡 = (𝜀1𝑡, 𝜀2𝑡, … , 𝜀𝐾𝑡)
′ is an unobservable error term 
representing the reduced form innovations with the following properties: 
 
𝐸[𝜀𝑡] =  0      (3) 
    𝐸[𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑠′] = 0 ∀ 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠      (4) 
 
and where, equation (5) represents the relationship between the reduced-form shocks and 
structural shocks where 𝜀𝑡 spans the space of the structural shocks 𝑈𝑡, 
 
𝜀𝑡  =  𝐵0
−1𝑈𝑡.                                      (5) 
An SVAR model allows for contemporaneous relationships between the variables and also 
allows us to study the effect of a shock to one equation whilst other shocks remain constant. 
This makes the SVAR model more appropriate than a reduced-form VAR model in which error 
terms are correlated and hence, error terms cannot be decomposed into mutually orthogonal 
shocks (Schenck, 2016). This follows since,    
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Following that 𝐵0 is lower triangular, the Cholesky decomposition is used to construct the 
impulse responses to orthogonal/structural form shocks. These impulse response functions are 
generated in EViews and confidence intervals of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications are included in each generated impulse response function. The significance of 
shocks is interpreted at a 5% level of significance as each impulse response function includes 
a 95% confidence interval.  Shocks are statistically significant when the confidence interval 
does not contain zero.9 The order of the variables may be switched in multiple ways but existing 
literature justifies the ordering of the variables used in this chapter. The ordering of the variables 
is in line with the ordering used by Cocriş and Nucu (2013) with the authors assuming that a 
recursive transmission scheme exists under the assumptions that firstly, industrial production 
is not immediately affected by monetary policy shocks and secondly, loan-to-deposit ratios 
(credit growth in this chapter), stock indices and the exchange rate may be affected immediately 
by monetary policy shocks.  The variables are ordered as above due to the assumption that 
industrial production affects all other variables contemporaneously.  Geske and Roll (1983) 
find that changes in real activity, in our case growth in industrial production, lead to changes in 
money supply, in our case interest rate changes, and in turn, changes in the stock market.10 
 
The ordering of our variables assumes that the exchange rate is affected contemporaneously by 
industrial production, interest rates, credit growth and the stock market which is in line with 
Hacker et al. (2012) who find evidence that the exchange rate is granger caused by the nominal 
interest rate differential.  Robinson (1952) argues that financial development follows economic 
growth.  In our case, growth in industrial production has a contemporaneous effect on credit 
growth.  Bartov and Bodnar (1994) show that changes in the dollar affect current abnormal firm 
 
9 I also conclude statistical significance in the cases where the confidence interval does not contain zero for the 
majority of periods included and also where a single band of the confidence interval is only marginally above or 
below zero. 
10 Kim (2003) also finds that stock price movements are driven, to some extent, by interest rate movements.  Fama 
(1981) and Najand and Noronha (1998) show that industrial production is affected by both interest rates and 
inflation at a lag and hence, not contemporaneously.   





returns with a lag, this is in line with Angelos (2010) who finds that the volatility of the 
exchange rate in the US, the UK and Japan is largely determined by the volatility of home stock 
returns.11  The order of the variables is switched in two robustness checks to confirm the 
ordering of the primary matrix. The impulse response functions are not affected by the relevant 
changes in the ordering of the variables in any cases.  
 
Three unit root analyses are conducted namely, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test and the Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (HEGY).  Both 
the PP test and the ADF test shows that the year-on-year growth rates of all but two cases have 
an order of integration of I(0) and hence, the growth rates are stationary.  The third unit root 
test, the HEGY test, is included to account for the seasonally unadjusted data as well as the 
annual differencing used.  When looking at the test statistics for frequency 0, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for the case of the stock market in Colombia, 
credit in Portugal and the exchange rate in Portugal.  When considering the semi-annual 
frequency, annual frequency as well as the joint significance of the full set of unit roots 
(seasonal and non-seasonal frequencies), the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases and 
therefore, no unit roots are present.  In the case of the Colombian stock market and the 
Portuguese exchange rate, the presence of the unit root may be a small sample effect.  However, 
the joint significance of the full set of unit roots is rejected.  Therefore, the presence of unit 
roots should not be an issue in our sample.  
 
2.3.2. Data 
The GFC emphasized the need to focus on both financial stability as well as price stability as 
the primary objective of Central Banks prior to the GFC had been the maintenance of price 
stability. Three proxies for financial stability together with IPI to account for economic growth 
are included in the analysis with each proxy representing a sector of the economy which could 
potentially conceal financial stability risks (Cocriş and Nucu, 2013). Monetary policy is 
represented by the short-term interest rate and the shadow rate in this chapter, short term interest 
rates are available from the IFS (for Chile) and the FRED (Colombia).  In the case of the 
 
11 Yang and Doong (2004) note that empirical evidence shows that changes in stock prices affect exchange rate 
movements.  However, the impact of changes in the exchange rate on stock market prices is less significant. It is 
thought that stock markets have a more noticeable effect on exchange rates due to the deregulation of financial 
markets which has decreased the difficulty of and stimulated capital flows across borders.   





advanced economies, the shadow rate (Krippner (2013) and Krippner (2015) shadow/lower 
bound framework) is used as a measure of monetary policy intervention.  The shadow rate is 
used in the case of the advanced economies due to the inability of policy rates to fully capture 
the extent of monetary policy intervention in the presence of quantitative easing and other 
unconventional monetary policy tools.  The use of the shadow rate allows one to see the effect 
of monetary policy tools on factors such as the unemployment rate and industrial production 
without the limitation of the zero-lower bound on policy rates. 
 
The relevant variables are as follows: 
• Credit growth as a proxy for the banking system (BIS total credit statistics); 
• Stock index as a proxy for the capital market (Federal Reserve Economic Data); 
• The Exchange rate measured as local currency units per unit of US dollar as a proxy 
for the foreign exchange market (Federal Reserve Economic Data), exchange rates 
quoted as US dollar units per unit of local currency are converted; 
• Industrial production as a proxy for economic growth (Federal Reserve Economic 
Data). 
 
Ivanov and Kilian (2001) suggest that the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is appropriate 
when considering monthly data, the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) is 
appropriate when considering quarterly data with a sample size larger than 120 observations 
and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is appropriate when considering 
quarterly data with any sample size.  The SBIC suggests that 2 lags be used for the case of Chile 
while 1 lag is suggested for the case of Portugal. All three information criteria suggest that 2 
lags be used for the case of Colombia while 1 lag is suggested for the case of Japan.  Lastly, the 
HQIC and the SBIC suggest 1 lag for the case of the UK. 
 
The dataset created contains data for Chile between 2004Q3 and 2018Q4, Colombia between 
2003Q1 and 2016Q1, Japan between 1996Q2 and 2018Q2, Portugal between 2000Q2 and 
2018Q2 and the UK between 1996Q2 and 2018Q2. Breaks exist in the dataset, the number of 
observations quoted below is based on a balanced SVAR estimation with the suggested number 
of lags. The SVAR and the resulting impulse response functions therefore have the following 
number of observations.  Chile has 58 observations, Colombia has 53 observations, Japan has 





82 observations, Portugal has 75 observations and the UK has 91 observations.  To assess the 
extent to which the differing sample periods may affect the results, a robustness check, the 
results of which are not statistically significantly different, limiting the sample period to the 
period between 2004:Q3 and 2016:Q1 is conducted. Figure 1 plots the quarterly Central Bank 
policy rate for the five countries as well as the shadow rates for Japan, Portugal and the UK 
over the period between 1960 and 2019. 
 
Figure 1 - Quarterly Central Bank Policy Rates and Shadow Rates for Chile, Colombia, 
Japan, Portugal and the UK 
 
Data Source: IFS, FRED, Krippner (2013) and Krippner (2015). 
 
  





2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Main Results 
Table 1 summarises the responses of the individual variables to shocks in the Central Bank 
policy rate (Chile and Colombia) and the shadow rate (Japan, Portugal and the UK).  In three 
of the five cases (Colombia, Japan and Portugal), industrial production declines following a 
monetary policy shock while, for Chile and the UK, industrial production increases.  This result 
is statistically significant for the case of Chile.  Similarly, the former three cases experience an 
increase in credit growth following a monetary policy shock while the latter experience a 
decline.  These results are statistically significant in the case of Colombia in the short run and 
the cases of Chile, Colombia and Portugal in the long run.  The level of the stock market index 
declines in four of the five cases with the level decreasing in the case of Chile.  These results 
are statistically significant for Chile and Colombia in both the short run and the long run.  
Finally, the exchange rate declines in three of the cases (Chile, Japan and Portugal) and 
increases for the cases of Colombia and the UK.  This corresponds to an appreciation of the 
local currencies for the first three cases following a monetary policy shock which is in line with 
conventional wisdom while, for the cases of Colombia and the UK, the currency depreciates.  
These results are statistically significant for the case of Colombia in the short run and Colombia 
and Portugal in the long run. 
 
Table 1 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock 
(Quarterly Data) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 





2.4.2 Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness checks are conducted in an effort to validate the results. A robustness 
check using monthly data (Table 2) is included as the accuracy of an SVAR model increases as 
the number of observations increases. The results show that there is a sign change for the case 
of industrial production for Chile with the sign being positive and statistically significant when 
considering quarterly data and the sign becoming negative without statistical significance when 
considering monthly data. Both industrial production and the stock market have a sign change 
for the case of Japan, credit has a sign change for the case of Portugal and both the exchange 
rate and credit have a sign change for the UK.  Neither the results for these cases in the original 
sample nor the results for these cases in the monthly dataset are statistically significant.  Lastly, 
there is a sign change for credit in Japan with the sign changing from positive to statistically 
significant and negative.   
 
Table 2 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock  
(Monthly Data) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 
 
A second robustness check (Table 3) using monthly log data shows that the exchange rate 
depreciated after an interest rate shock in the case of Chile and Colombia while the exchange 
rate appreciates in the case of Japan, Portugal and the UK in line with conventional wisdom.   
 
 





Table 3 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock  
(Monthly Log Data)
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 
 
A third robustness check (Table 4) using quarterly data with an adjusted start date and end date 
of the data to ensure that the period studied remains constant for all cases is included.  This 
robustness check studies the period between 2004:Q3 and 2016:Q1.  The results show that there 
is a sign change for the UK for industrial production when limiting the time period and there is 
no sign change for credit growth in any of the cases.  The results also show that there is a sign 
change for Japan for the stock market as well as a sign change for Japan and the UK for the 
exchange rate.  Similarly to the first robustness check, neither the results for these cases in the 
original sample nor the results for these cases in the limited sample are statistically significant.  
One may therefore conclude that the difference in sample periods across countries does not 













Table 4 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock 
(Quarterly with Adjusted Starting Date) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 
 
Further, two robustness checks (Table 5 and Table 6) using a different ordering of variables 
and quarterly data are included to check whether a change in the ordering of the variables leads 
to a change in the results.  Table 5 presents the results of the case where the position of the short 
term policy rates innovation and the industrial production innovation are switched while, Table 
6 presents the results of the case where the position of the stock price innovation and the 
exchange rate innovation are switched.  There are no sign changes resulting from the change in 
variable ordering.   
 
Table 5 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock 
(Quarterly with Adjusted Order) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 





Table 6 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock 
(Quarterly with Adjusted Order) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response, * statistically significant response at 5% level. 
 
Finally, to add to the robustness of the results, a sixth robustness check (Table 7) using quarterly 
data and a BVAR model is employed. The BVAR model is used as a robustness check to 
address the concern arising from the small sample size as BVAR models have a shrinkage 
estimator, which adjusts coefficients to match the data observed and permits the optimisation 
of the dataset.  A distinct advantage of the BVAR model is the lack of a requirement to limit 
the number of coefficients to be estimated as this model makes use of a prior, in this case, the 
Minessota prior introduced in Litterman (1979) is used. The use of the Minessota prior and 
hence, a random walk prior is appropriate in this analysis (Litterman, 1979).  This is due to the 
random behaviour of macroeconomic time series as well as the flexibility of the restrictions 
imposed.  The results are similar to those of the main results of this chapter, with the sign of 
the change staying the same for the majority of cases with the exception of industrial production 
for Japan and the UK and the exchange rate for the UK.  In the remaining cases, the magnitude 












Table 7 - Summary of Responses of Variables to a Central Bank Policy Shock 
(Quarterly BVAR) 
 
Note: - negative response, + positive response. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The financial turmoil caused by the GFC highlighted the importance of financial stability and 
resulted in the relationship between financial stability and monetary policy becoming an 
important element when policy mandates were updated in the period after the crisis. In this 
chapter, the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial stability for the cases of Chile, 
Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK is analysed. The five countries chosen have autonomous, 
inflation targeting Central Banks with floating exchange rate regimes in place, which allows us 
to analyse the impact of monetary policy shocks on five countries with similar policy mandates.  
The set of countries presents an interesting case with Colombia and Chile being categorized as 
emerging economies with a history of limited availability of data, the UK and Japan facing 
political uncertainty and economic uncertainty respectively and finally, Portugal which 
experienced the most profound economic growth in the group of countries that received an 
injection of European funding.   
An SVAR model is employed and impulse response functions are used in an effort to test the 
impact of monetary policy on financial stability.  Credit growth, the stock market index growth 
and the exchange rate growth are included as proxies for financial stability while industrial 
production growth is included as a proxy for the business cycle.  As in Cocriş and Nucu (2013), 
the impact of short term interest rates and shadow rates on three proxies for financial stability 
namely, credit growth, stock prices and the exchange rate is studied. Industrial production is 





included as a proxy for the real sector and hence, for economic growth. In line with Cocriş and 
Nucu (2013), policy rates are used to represent monetary policy choices in emerging economies.  
Shadow rates are used to represent monetary policy intervention in advanced economies. 
Our main results show that monetary policy may be used to correct asset mispricing due to the 
inverse relationship between the policy rate and the stock market index for the majority of cases 
namely, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Conventional wisdom suggests that a positive 
monetary policy shock would result in a currency appreciation in countries with a floating 
exchange rate regime as foreign investment is attracted.  The results show that the exchange 
rate appreciates in both the short run and the long run following a monetary policy shock for 
three of the five cases namely, the cases of Chile, Japan and Portugal while the currency 
depreciates for the cases of Colombia and the UK.  The currency depreciation in the case of 
Colombia could be attributed to Colombia’s reliance on commodity exports.  The currency 
depreciation in the case of the UK is in line with earlier literature including, Caglayan et al. 
(2011) and is attributed to uncertainty in the local market.   
 
The results also show that monetary policy may be used to control fluctuations in the real 
business cycle as can be seen by the inverse relationship between the industrial production 
index and monetary policy shocks for the cases of Colombia, Japan, and Portugal.  Credit 
growth also has an inverse relationship with monetary policy shocks for the cases of Chile and 
the UK. Consequently, monetary policy may be used to tame credit cycles in some cases.  
However, in the majority of cases namely, Colombia, Japan and Portugal, there is a positive 
relationship between credit and monetary policy shocks.  Monetary policy intervention, as 
represented by policy rates in the cases of emerging market economies and shadow rates in the 
cases of advanced economies, may indeed be successful at contributing to or achieving financial 
stability.  However, our results show that monetary policy may not have the ability to maintain 
or re-establish financial stability in all cases.  Alternative policy choices such as 
macroprudential policy tool frameworks which are aimed at targeting the financial system as a 
whole may be implemented to buttress the economy.





2.6. Appendix A 
A.1. Structural Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact (Quarterly) 
Chile 
Figure A1.1 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure A1.2 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure A1.3 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure A1.4 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to 
Shadow Rate 
 




Response of Credit to Shadow Rate 
 
Response of Stock Market to Shadow 
Rate
 












Figure A1.5 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to 
Shadow Rate 
 





Response of Credit to Shadow Rate 
 
Response of Stock Market to Shadow 
Rate 
 






A.2. Cumulative Structural Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact (Quarterly) 
Chile  
Figure A2.1 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure A2.2 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure A2.3 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure A2.4 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure A2.5 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of quarters after the shock 
Source:  Author’s estimates based on Datastream and BIS statistics, IRFs generated in EViews. 
 
 




2.7. Appendix B 
B.1. Quarterly Variable Sources 
Table B1 - Quarterly Sources of Variables 
 




B.2. Quarterly Variable Definitions 
Table B2 - Quarterly Definitions of Variables 
 




B.3. Quarterly Summary Statistics 


















2.8. Appendix C 
C.1. Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo Unit Root Test for the Presence of a Unit Root 
Table C1 - Results of Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo Unit Root Tests
 










Note: Hylleberg, Engle, Granger and Yoo (HEGY) Test results based on: Ho: Series contains a unit root and Ha: 
No unit root present.  The presence of a unit root is rejected for the cases where the |test statistic| < |critical 
value|.  Cases where we fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root are highlighted in grey. 
  




C.2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for the Presence of a Unit Root 
Table C2 - Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Level Data) 
 
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results based on: Ho: Series contains a unit root and Ha: No unit 
root present. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are quoted.  The presence of a unit root is rejected for the 
cases where the p-value < 0.1. 
 
 




C.3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for the Presence of a Unit Root 
Table C3- Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (First Differenced Data)  
 
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test results based on: Ho: Series contains a unit root and Ha: No unit 
root present. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are quoted.  The presence of a unit root is rejected for the 
cases where the p-value < 0.1. 
 
  




C.4. Phillips-Perron Test for the Presence of a Unit Root 
Table C4 - Results of Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test results based on: Ho: Series contains a unit root and Ha: No unit root 
present. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are quoted.  The presence of a unit root is rejected for the cases 










2.9. Appendix D 
The first robustness check makes use of a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model and 
impulse response functions to identify the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial 
stability. I apply this methodology to the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
using monthly data.  Growth rates are y-o-y. 
 
The lag length is selected using AIC and FPE.  The AIC and FPE suggest seven lags for Chile, 
Japan, Portugal and the UK while eight lags are suggested for Colombia. 
 
Monthly time series data is used, with the exception being credit data, which is available 
quarterly.  The quarterly credit data is interpolated using Cubic Spline to estimate the monthly 
values.  The number of observations is based on a balanced SVAR; Chile has 165 observations, 
Colombia has 141 observations, Japan has 261 observations, Portugal has 213 observations and 
lastly, the UK has 261 observations.  
 
D.1. Monthly Variable Sources 
Table D1 - Monthly Sources of Variables 
 




D.2. Monthly Variable Definitions 
Table D2 - Monthly Definitions of Variables 
 
  




D.3. Monthly Summary Statistics 








D.4. Structural Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure D4.1 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure D4.2 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure D4.3 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Portugal 
Figure D4.4 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to 
Shadow Rate 
 




Response of Credit to Shadow Rate 
 
Response of Stock Market to Shadow 
Rate 
 













Figure D4.5 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in the UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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D.5. Cumulative Structural Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure D5.1 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure D5.2 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure D5.3 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure D5.4 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure D5.5 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of months after the shock 








2.10. Appendix E 
The second robustness check makes use of a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model 
and impulse response functions to identify the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial 
stability. I apply this methodology to the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
using quarterly data.  Growth rates are y-o-y.  The SVAR model and the impulse response 
functions are generated with a different Cholesky ordering to that of the main results.  The 



















































The lag length is selected using HQIC and the SBIC.  Both the HQIC and the SBIC suggest 2 
lags for the case of Chile, the SBIC suggests 2 lags for the case of Colombia and both the HQIC 
and the SBIC suggest 1 lag for the cases of Japan, Portugal and the UK. 
 
E.1. Structural Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure E1.1 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure E1.2 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure E1.3 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure E1.4 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure E1.5 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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E.2. Cumulative Structural Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact 
Chile  
Figure E2.1 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure E2.2 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure E2.3 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure E2.4 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure E2.5 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to 
Shadow Rate 
 




Response of Credit to Shadow Rate 
 
Response of Stock Market to Shadow 
Rate 
 
Response of Exchange Rate to Shadow 
Rate 
 
Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of months after the shock 
Source:  Author’s estimates based on Datastream and BIS statistics, IRFs generated in EViews. 
 
  




2.11. Appendix F 
The third robustness check makes use of a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model 
and impulse response functions to identify the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial 
stability. I apply this methodology to the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
using quarterly data.  Growth rates are y-o-y.  The SVAR model and the impulse response 
functions are generated with a different Cholesky ordering to that of the main results.  The 



















































The lag length is selected using HQIC and the SBIC.  Both the HQIC and the SBIC suggest 2 
lags for the case of Chile, the SBIC suggests 2 lags for the case of Colombia and both the HQIC 
and the SBIC suggest 1 lag for the cases of Japan, Portugal and the UK. 
 
F.1. Structural Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure F1.1 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure F1.2 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure F1.3 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure F1.4 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
 
Response of Industrial Production to 
Shadow Rate 
 




Response of Credit to Shadow Rate 
 
Response of Stock Market to Shadow 
Rate 
 





Figure F1.5 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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F.2. Cumulative Structural Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact 
Chile  
Figure F2.1 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure F2.2- Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure F2.3 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure F2.4 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure F2.5 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of months after the shock 










2.12. Appendix G 
The fourth robustness check makes use of a Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) model 
and impulse response functions to identify the impact of monetary policy shocks on financial 
stability. I apply this methodology to the cases of Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
using quarterly data.  Growth rates are y-o-y. 
 
The BVAR model and the impulse response functions are generated with the same ordering to 
that of the main results.  The lag length is selected using HQIC and the SBIC.  Both the HQIC 
and the SBIC suggest 2 lags for the case of Chile, the SBIC suggests 2 lags for the case of 
Colombia and both the HQIC and the SBIC suggest 1 lag for the cases of Japan, Portugal and 
the UK. 
 
G.1. Structural Impulse Response Functions: Short Run Impact 
Chile 
Figure G1.1 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure G1.2 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure G1.3 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure G1.4 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure G1.5 - Short Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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G.2. Cumulative Structural Impulse Response Functions: Long Run Impact 
Chile  
Figure G2.1 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Chile 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Chile to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure G2.2- Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Colombia 
Responses of industrial production, the Central Bank policy rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in 
Colombia to a Central Bank policy rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 
replications is included. 
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Figure G2.3 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Japan 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Japan to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure G2.4 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: Portugal 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in Portugal to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Figure G2.5 - Long Run Structural Impulse Response Function: The UK 
Responses of industrial production, the shadow rate, credit, stock market and the exchange rate in The UK to a 
shadow rate shock.  A confidence interval of 2 standard deviations based on 1000 replications is included. 
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Note: Vertical Axes – the deviation from the baseline level 
Horizontal Axes – the number of months after the shock 








2.13 Appendix H 
H.1. List of Policy Choices Implemented in Chile, Colombia, Portugal, Japan and the 
UK 
Chile 
Dedollarization and dollarization events – 1959 to 1962 
Partial dollarization - 1977 to 1982 
Dedollarization and indexation – 1982 to 1983 
Indexation – 1985 to 1989 
Persistence of indexation – 1990 to 2000 
Inflation targeting – 1991 
Fully fledged inflation targeting – 1999 
Free floating exchange rate - 1999 
De-indexation – 2001 
Reserve requirements allowing non-dollar reserves – 2008 
No active reserve requirements – raise policy rates in times of capital inflows and reduce with 
outflows 
Reserve requirements – 4.5%  
 
Colombia 
Pegged exchange rate – 1915 to 1931 (UK pound) 
Pegged exchange rate – 1931 to 1993 (US dollar) 
Free floating exchange rate – 1999 
Inflation targeting – 1999 
Marginal Reserve Requirements – 2007 
Reserve Requirement Abolished – 2008 
 
Portugal 
Pegged exchange rate – 1928 to 1950s (UK pound) 
Pegged exchange rate – 1992 to 1999 (US dollar) 
Free floating euro exchange rate - 1999 
Reserve requirements – 2% from 1999 
Inflation targeting – 2003 
Quantitative Easing – 2009 




Reserve requirements – 1% from 2012  
Extended Quantitative Easing Policies – 2016 
 
Japan 
Free floating exchange rate – 1973 
Reserve requirements – 1.2% from 1991 
Reserve requirements – 1.75% from 1986 
Initial Quantitative Easing Policies (Not yet referred to as QE) – 1997 to 1998 
Quantitative Easing – 2001 
Extended Quantitative Easing Policies – 2010 
Inflation targeting – 2013 
Extended Quantitative Easing Policies – 2014 
 
The UK 
Reserve Requirement – 1971 to 1980 
Reserve Requirement Abolished – 1981 
Reserves averaging – 1981 to 2009 
Inflation targeting – 1992 
Free floating exchange rate – 1992 
Interest on excess reserves – 2009 
Quantitative Easing – 2009 
Extended Quantitative Easing Policies – 2011 
Extended Quantitative Easing Policies – 2016 
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The Role of Central Banks and the Political Environment 
in Financial Stability: A Few Case Studies 
Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK 
 
3.1. Introduction 
On 15 September 2008, the Great Recession entered a critical phase when Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy. The financial crisis was preceded by a period known as the Great 
Moderation, which saw the US experience a period of major financial deregulation. Financial 
instability and the subsequent credit crunches experienced by a number of countries following 
two decades of global structural reforms highlighted the importance of stabilising credit supply 
and assigning a higher importance to financial stability. Although many EMEs such as those in 
Latin America started to assign a higher importance to financial stability following earlier crises 
experienced by the region in the early 1990s, the financial stability of AEs only became a 
concern during the financial crisis when AEs failed to contain and prevent the damage caused.  
 
As Latin American economies continue to become more open and integrated in global markets, 
the study of the financial stability of these countries becomes paramount.  Additionally, in light 
of the consequences of the GFC and the somewhat limited reach of conventional monetary pool 
tools in recent times, the study of the financial stability as well as the use of alternative policy 
frameworks of the AEs in this analysis is fundamental.  The level of CBI is the degree of direct 
influence that the government and politicians have over monetary policy decisions. Higher 
levels of CBI are generally associated with increased 
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transparency and in turn, improved institutional quality. In this chapter, higher levels of CBI 
indicate a greater degree of monetary policy freedom.   Maxfield (1997) points out that while 
only three Central Banks became legally independent in the 1980s, the 1990s saw more than 
thirty Central Banks become legally independent. Cukierman (2008) notes that, “during the 
forty years ending in 1989 there had hardly been reforms in CB legislation”.  Further, 
Fernández-Albertos (2015) shows that the majority of reforms occurred during the 1990s. 
 
In this chapter, I look at the structure and functioning of Central banks in two Latin American 
countries namely, Chile and Colombia, two European countries namely, the UK and Portugal 
and one Asian country namely, Japan. I then consider the political environment and the 
financial stability of these countries, I substantiate the discussion with a brief empirical analysis 
of the effect of CBI on credit growth using an existing database created by Romelli (2018).  Our 
main results show that there is a positive relationship between credit growth and the level of 
CBI due to the positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between 
growth in domestic credit to the private sector and the level of CBI for the cases of Portugal 
and the UK for the second regression equation. When considering domestic credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions, the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant for the cases of Chile, Portugal and the UK for the second regression and the UK 
for the third regression equation. A number of robustness checks show that the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant for a number of cases when implementing a variety of 
estimation methods.  Indeed, lending booms are needed to ensure financial development in the 
form of increased intermediation (permanent capital deepening) on the part of banks.  However, 
banking crises are often preceded by periods of intense credit growth in which capital deepening 
is not permanent.12  Fluctuations in credit growth are larger for higher levels of CBI and hence, 
in periods of financial instability or ultimately financial crises, CBI would be reined back in an 
effort to re-establish financial stability. 
 
The rest of the chapter is as follows, Section 2 discusses the Central Bank setting and Section 
3 discusses both the political environment and the financial stability in these countries, Section 
4 makes use of a simple empirical analysis to substantiate the discussion and lastly, Section 5 
concludes. 
 
12 See Gourinchas et al. (2001). 
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3.2. The Central Banks 
According to Bernhard (2002), CBI is the ability of the Central Bank to control monetary 
instruments. Bernhard (1998, 2002) also points out that economic integration may lead to intra-
party conflict over monetary policy that could in turn damage the stability of the government.  
At the same time CBI may remove intra-party conflicts over monetary policy and as such may 
be viewed as a channel by which cabinet stability and durability may increase.  Bodea and 
Hicks (2015), Cukierman (1992), Cukierman et al. (1992), Cukierman et al. (2002), Persson 
and Tabellini (1990) and Rogoff (1985) all show that CBI has the ability to stabilise the 
economy by decreasing inflation, reducing inflation volatility, reducing uncertainty in the 
economy and increasing monetary policy credibility.  Independent Central Bank countries are 
also more likely to maintain or attract capital inflows during interwar periods as investors have 
confidence in the lack of political motives behind the pegging with gold (Simmons, 1994).  
Garriga (2016) finds that lower-middle income and low-income countries had more stable 
levels of CBI throughout the period between 1970 and 2012.  
 
The five countries analysed all have somewhat autonomous Central Banks.  According to the 
CBI index used in this chapter, BdP is the most independent Central Bank in the sample, Banco 
de la República is the most independent when considering the two Latin American countries in 
the sample and Bank of Japan is the least independent.  All five Central Banks act as a lender 
of last resort and the main objective of all five Central Banks is the achievement of price 
stability by controlling monetary supply and interest rates.  However, four of these Central 
Banks are also responsible for the maintenance of a stable financial system by ensuring the 
settlement of funds amongst banks and other financial institutions.  The governor of the Banco 
de la República is not accountable for financial stability as it is considered to be beyond the 
scope of the Central Banks’ mandate.  All five countries have Deposit Insurance Systems13 
which, are designed to minimise or eliminate depositors’ risk when depositing funds in bank 
accounts.  The existence of this guarantee ties in with the lender of last resort function. 
 
BCCH was established with a degree of operational independence in August 1925. The BCCH 
adopted a partial inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy in 1990 and in 1999, the 
 
13 The Deposit Insurance Systems in Colombia, Japan and the UK belong to the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers as of April 2020.   
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Central Bank fully adopted an inflation-targeting framework in combination with a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Adopting a flexible exchange rate regime removes the BCCH’s ability 
to intervene in the market when atypical circumstances present themselves. In the years leading 
up to an independent monetary policy for the BCCH, fiscal policy was given preference in 
decision making which resulted in periods of extreme inflation due to the inability to implement 
an effective stabilisation policy (Marshall, 2003). Looking at the opposite side of the coin, 
sustainable monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability may lead to both lower 
inflation and lower output volatility.  In 1975, the Monetary Council was established, the 
orderly and progressive development of the national economy took place and the autonomy of 
the Central Bank was legally established. In 2007, the maintenance of annual inflation of the 
CPI at a level of 3 percent with a 1 percent leeway in each direction became the main objective 
of the BCCH.  
 
The Colombian Central Bank (Banco Nacional) was established in 1880 and served as the 
government’s banker and the issuer of the national currency. The Law of the Banco de la 
República (Law 31) states that “Banco de la República is a legal entity of the public law, which 
will continue functioning as a state‐owned body of the constitutional rank, with a legal regimen 
of its own, with its own and special nature, and with administrative, patrimonial and technical 
autonomy”.  A number of structural reforms have been implemented over the past three decades 
in an effort to promote and ensure greater independence of Banco de la República.  The most 
important reform was the decision to prioritise inflation control and hence to preserve the 
currency’s buying power although, the consideration and co-ordination with general economic 
policy remained important. The Central Banks’ mandate of maintaining price stability is 
established at a constitutional level in Colombia with the main monetary instrument used in 
monetary policy being the Repo interest rate.   
 
The BoJ was established with the Bank of Japan Act of 1882 in an effort to centralize currency 
production although the yen had been established earlier with the New Currency Act of 1871.  
In 1949, the Policy Board was established, the Policy Board is the highest decision-making 
body within the Bank. The BoJ Act of 1942 stated that, “the regulation of the currency, control 
and facilitation of credit and finance, and the maintenance and fostering of the credit system, 
pursuant to national policy, in order that the general economic activities of the nation might be 
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adequately enhanced”, are the objectives of the BoJ.  Revisions to the BoJ Act in 1997 gave the 
CBI as it originally acted as a branch of the Japanese government and today, the Bank is neither 
a governmental agency nor a private corporation.  The BoJ introduced a price stability target in 
2013 namely, an inflation rate target of 2 percent.  Lastly, the Bank is responsible for upholding 
confidence in the currency. 
 
BdP was established in 1846 by the Decree of 19 November 1846 and served as the country’s 
Central Bank until 1999.  Although it still acts as its own entity, it is now a member of the 
ESCB and as such pursues the objectives of the ESCB.  1931 saw a new era for banking rules 
in which the growth of liabilities of BdP was limited to a proportion of the amount held in 
foreign reserves, this resulted in improved monetary control, as the Bank was no longer able to 
freely finance the government.  The Bank became increasingly more dependent on the 
government for administrative purposes and started to pursue both fixed interest and fixed 
exchange rates.  By 1960, laws had been approved that required banks to hold minimum cash 
reserve balances and also gave BdP the power to intervene in both credit control and interest 
rate movements.  BdP was founded as a public limited company and was nationalised in 1974.  
The Organic Law of 15 November 1975 redefined BdP’s functions and officially gave the Bank 
the role of Central Bank, the Bank was also given the power to supervise the banking system. 
The Organic Law of October 1990 increased the independence of board members and the 
Organic Law of January 1998 reinforced the independence of BdP.  The CCR contains credit 
related information and is managed by BdP.  BdP is responsible for the regulation of banking 
activities in Portugal as well as ensuring the stability, efficiency and robustness of the financial 
system. 
 
The delegation of interest rate responsibility to the BoE in 1997 meant that the Bank became 
politically independent and now, the BoE is responsible for the setting of monetary policy and 
hence, the maintenance of monetary stability and the maintenance of financial stability. The 
BoE works closely with the Treasury who is responsible for economic and financial policy.  
The MPC which, is a division of the BoE, is responsible for interest rate decisions with the aim 
of achieving the inflation target established by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As a whole, 
the BoE says that its role is “Promoting the good of the people of the United Kingdom by 
maintaining monetary and financial stability”, the 1988 BoE Act confirms this by stating that 
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the Banks’ top priority is achieving price stability.14 The Bank’s position as a lender of last 
resort once again became apparent in 2007 when the BoE acted as a lender of last resort to 
Northern Rock following a bank failure.  The BoE and the PRA published discussion notes on 
proposals in October and December of 2018 in preparation for the UK’s departure from the EU 
in an effort to ensure that the legal framework is well established at the time of the UK’s 
departure from the EU. 
 
3.3. The Political Environment and Financial Stability 
Bernhard and Leblang (2002) and Clark et al. (2013) show that CBI may have important 
political consequences. Eijffinger and de Haan (1996)15 discuss the three dimensions of CBI 
namely, financial, personnel and policy independence.  King (2003) points out that politicians 
now have a reduced number of instruments available as they have transferred monetary policy 
control to unelected Central Bankers. Unfortunately, an independent Central Bank does not 
necessarily shield the Central Bank from the influence of the government and threats to CBI 
still exist (Lohmann, 1998).   
 
McNamara (2002) points out that Central Banks remain resolutely political and partisan 
institutions due to policy making which has identifiable and important distribution effects.  
Berman and McNamara (1999) mention that democratic accountability may be of concern when 
Central Banks are responsible for monetary policy as Central Bankers are not elected by the 
public and hence, are not accountable to the public. Many politicians choose to artificially 
stimulate the economy in the lead up to elections, Clark et al. (1998) point out that politicians 
who hope to maximize their votes will favour the ability to influence monetary policy and 
hence, will not choose to have an independent Central Bank, which limits their ability to affect 
monetary policy. In more recent times, due to financial and economic integration, political 
leaders are held accountable to foreign markets and the independence of Central Banks has 
once again become attractive (Keohane and Milner, 1996). 
 
 
14 Price stability in the case of the BoE is defined as an inflation rate of 2 percent per annum. 
15 Financial independence refers to the government’s ability to use Central Bank loans to fund expenditures, to 
avoid monetary policy subordination (Garriga, 2016). Personnel independence deals with the ability of the 
government to influence the board membership of the Central Bank.  Policy independence refers to the Central 
Bank’s ability to formulate, specify, execute or set goals for monetary policy (Debelle and Fischer, 1995). 
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Empirical studies by Vernon (1983), Shan (1991) and Kim and Hwang (1992) identify a 
negative relationship between political and economic risks and the level of ownership in the 
foreign investment.  Hennart (1988) and Hill et al. (1990) find that the utilisation of lower 
ownership models in host countries exhibiting higher political risk and uncertainty may reduce 
the level of host country risk and transaction costs.  On one hand, De Haas et al. (2011) shows 
that multinational bank subsidiaries reduce lending more drastically than domestic banks.  On 
the other hand, Navaretti et al. (2010) find that multinational banks maintained stable loan-to-
deposit ratios and hence, acted as a stabilizing agent in Europe and De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2006) show that during local crises, foreign bank lending is typically more stable than domestic 
bank lending in emerging European countries 
 
3.3.1. Chile 
The dictatorship saw Chile become one of the most open economies of the developing world.16 
The economic reforms implemented during President Allende’s rule set the basis for the major 
investment and growth that the country experienced in the early 1990s. This military 
government was also responsible for the abolishment of a democratic political tradition and at 
the heart of multiple human rights violations. In March 1990, Chile returned to a democracy, 
following the seventeen-year dictatorship, when Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin was 
elected. The remnants of a dictatorship continued to influence the democratic government for 
almost a decade.  The turn of the century saw the democratic process become more resilient 
and in 2005, the senate approved changes to Pinochet’s constitution. August 2006 saw Beijing 
sign its first South American free-trade deal17 and by 2017, the binomial voting system18 was 
also abandoned resulting in a fully democratic election process.  Pinochet’s economy was 
extremely successful due to the lifting of the U.S. trade sanctions against the Allende 
government. The election of President Sebastian Pinera in 2017 has resulted in improved 
economic circumstances, decreased unemployment and an overall feeling of certainty. 
 
16 “Neoliberalism is generally associated with policies like cutting trade tariffs and barriers. Its influence has 
liberalized the international movement of capital, and limited the power of trade unions. It’s broken up state-owned 
enterprises, sold off public assets and generally opened up our lives to dominance by market thinking.” (Birch,  
2017) 
17 Chile and China sign a free-trade deal. 
18 Each district elects one representative from the largest two political parties unless the most popular party is twice 
as popular as the second most popular party. Critics claim that a binomial election process is undemocratic as it 
makes it more difficult for smaller political parties to gain parliamentary seats and the views of the general public 
are not necessarily reflected. 
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Laeven and Valencia (2012) show that Chile has not experienced a systematic banking crisis 
since 1982.  This may be an indicator of at least some level of financial stability. The financial 
crisis at the beginning of the 1980s can be attributed to an unstable macro policy framework 
combined with a liberalised and privatised banking system, which lacked both regulation and 
supervision. The late 1970s saw erratic capital inflows due to the open capital account and the 
fixed exchange rate. As is the experience of many Latin American countries leading up to and 
during a crisis, the banks’ low-quality credit supply boomed as a result of lax lending standards.  
An increase in the number of currency mismatches led to the collapse of banks following the 
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime, which, in turn brought the Chilean economy 
to an abrupt halt. Laeven and Valencia’s dataset shows that the Chilean financial crisis of 1982 
had a fiscal cost of 43 percent of GDP, an output loss of 8.6 percent and an 88 percent (of GDP) 
increase in public debt. 
 
The Chilean peso is known as a ‘commodity currency’ and currency movements in the past 
have generally followed the movements in copper prices.  Chile’s position as a commodity 
exporter increases the country’s vulnerability to capital inflows and spillovers.  Therefore, 
macroprudential policy tools are needed to address these risks, pension funds have already 
successfully stabilized non-resident capital flows. The Chilean policy makers have chosen to 
adapt a simplistic macroeconomic and macrofinance stance.  Because of this they abstain from 
actively updating their position.  Rodriguez-Delgado et al. (2013) focus on the recovery of 
Brazil and Chile and find that while Chile’s GDP is 3.5 percent below the pre-crisis trend, 
Brazil’s GDP is significantly lower at 11 percent below the pre-crisis trend level.   
 
Between 1996 and 2012, both the Chilean peso and Chilean home prices appreciated 
significantly.  Chilean policy makers felt that although the deficit would need to be monitored, 
the strong domestic demand had sustained imports (exports were weakened by abnormally high 
copper prices and lower demand in trade partners). The deficit was not severe enough to cause 
any immediate or near-term stability risk.  Kamil and Rai (2010) found that multinational 
banking subsidiaries that relied on domestic deposits were a stable credit source during the 
global crisis for Latin American countries.  The availability of credit allows businesses to fund 
profitable projects and to improve their investment prospects.  Further, the availability of credit 
gives households the opportunity to smooth consumption over their life cycle.  However, excess 
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credit and lax lending standards could potentially lead to higher credit delinquency ratios, 
excessive leverage, maturity mismatches and the general erosion of the financial system.  
 
3.3.2. Colombia 
Multiple Liberal and UP presidential candidates were murdered upon drug cartel instruction in 
1989.  As a result, Cesar Gaviria was elected on an anti-drug platform. Political peace seemed 
to be a real possibility. Colombian citizens, in a manner unmatched in Latin America, tend to 
resort to violence when political differences present themselves. Three presidential candidates 
were assassinated during the 1990 presidential campaign and many others had attempts made 
on their lives. In particular, the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan shook the country and 
resulted in university students organizing a Marcha del Silencio as a means of protesting against 
indiscriminate violence.  Although a new constitution was written in 1991 in an effort to restore 
peace, several guerrilla groups re-entered the political arena.  To make a precarious situation 
even worse, drug lords had taken over as the main threat to both political and social instability.19 
 
The credit boom in Colombia (and other Latin American countries) in the early 1990s led to an 
increase in the number of households taking out mortgages which, in turn led to a large increase 
in house prices. As household leverage and financial burden increased, the support for higher 
home prices decreased and prices began to plummet. In 1998 and 1999, Colombia experienced 
a credit crunch and faced extreme financial instability and systematic risk. By the early 2000s, 
20 percent of all mortgages in Colombia were not performing and banks had an indirect 
exposure to exchange rate risk due to unhedged borrowers. Government indebtedness grew and 
currency mismatches presented themselves leading to the deepest recession that Colombia had 
experienced in history. As discussed in King (2003), Mosley (2000) points out that policy 
details were not a major concern in the past. Instead, broad macroeconomic indicators were 
used to assess the global financial markets.  Although this may have been true in the past, the 
systematic crises experienced in Latin America made policy makers aware of the need to focus 
on policy details.  In an effort to prevent future crises and to limit systematic risk, the Colombian 
government chose to implement macroprudential policy. 
 
19 FARC was formally disbanded in 2017. 
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Colombia relies heavily on exports; has a small, open and banking orientated economy and low 
levels of domestic savings20.  In the early 1990s, the Colombian government implemented a 
series of structural reforms with the aim of promoting economic openness and financial 
liberalisation.  By the late 1990s, the country experienced one of the most severe financial crises 
in Colombian history as both financial operations as well as interest rates became less restricted.  
Colombia’s increased openness facilitated a large amount of capital inflows, which in Colombia 
are highly and positively correlated with credit supply.21 
 
3.3.3. Japan 
During the Meiji Restoration, Japan experienced a political system that relied on uncompetitive 
domestic forces and a less than ideal set of incentives for politicians. The Japanese described 
their country as having a “first-rate economy and third-rate politics (keizai irchiryu, seiji 
sanryu)” (Rosenbluth and Thies, 2010).  More recently, Japan’s new electoral rules established 
during 1994 have led to global integration and a more open work environment.  Ito (1990) finds 
that there is evidence that Japanese election timings are influenced by growth and inflation 
circumstances. In an effort to sway voters, elections tend to be called in high growth and low 
inflation periods. Yet, there is no influence of international variables such as exchange rates 
and foreign reserves on the timing of general elections or local economic performance.    
 
The new electoral system has also resulted in higher electoral volatility as prime ministers have 
rotated on an almost annual basis since 2006 (Kushida and Shimizu, 2013).  This ultimately 
counteracts the enhanced global integration and openness and this political instability spills 
over to the economy. Shinzo Abe became the prime minister of Japan in 2012 when the LDP 
once again won the national election; he was re-elected in 2014 and 2017. Abe has implemented 
a ‘three-arrow’ economic framework known as ‘Abenomics’22 aimed at boosting the Japanese 
economy.  Improved economic growth and a strong stock market resulted in Abe’s approval 
rating increasing to 70 percent. Unfortunately, political disagreements still exist, a prime 
example being the spiralling Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute.  This resulted in the exports to 
China falling by 14.5 percent between June and November 2012. Japan’s electoral system 
 
20 See Uribe (2012). 
21 See Carrasquilla et al. (2000), Tenjo & Lopez (2002), Villar et al. (2005) and Uribe (2012). 
22 The ‘three arrows’ of this economic framework are monetary easing, a flexible fiscal policy and structural reform 
and to date, the framework has been somewhat successful at stabilizing the yen exchange rate, improving consumer 
confidence and improving the integration of the stock market. 
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weakens the power of trade unions and may result in stubborn income inequality for years to 
come as the two largest political parties compete against one-another for the median vote. 
Although political debates now take place, public participation in elections is still low and many 
Japanese still feel a lack of trust and pride in both the political system and the country. 
 
A stronger, floating currency, asset deflation, and economic stagnation23 combined with the 
low demand for Japanese products led to a systematic crisis in 1997.  By 1997, Sanyo Securities 
and a number of financial institutions went bust as panic flooded the Japanese financial system.  
To add to this, Japan relies heavily on the export of cars and technology.  When worldwide 
demand for Japanese exports decreased during the global crisis, Japan entered its first recession 
since 2002.  To make matters worse, the 2011 Tsunami, increased the reliance on imports as all 
nuclear reactors24 in Japan were closed down and energy supply was reduced.  The Japanese 
financial system is sensitive to heightened financial risks from abroad and in October 2016, 
many factories across the globe, including those in Japan, decreased production as demand 
started to slow down in the face of the US-China trade war, slower global growth and political 
uncertainty in the presence of Brexit. The lower demand and slower production resulted in 
reduced exports.  
 
Hoshi and Okazaki (2002) note that the MoF was more concerned about rising real estate prices 
and the relationship with income distribution than the relationship between credit supply growth 
and financial instability.  Real estate prices and credit supply continued to grow as the MoF 
failed to decisively implement measures or regulation to curb this. ‘Shadow Banking’ also 
emerged in Japan in a similar way to the ‘Shadow Banking’ system in the US whereby Japanese 
banks provided credit to non-banking financial institutions who in turn provided real estate 
projects with credit. The use of the ‘Shadow Banking’ system continued to increase as the 
MoF’s recommendations on credit supply in the regulated banking sector became stricter.  
Japanese policy makers tend to implement the necessary policies after the fact instead of as a 
preventative measure which raises questions about the policy makers forecasting methods or 
policy choice implementation strategy25.  A large portion of Japanese national debt is held by 
 
23 Dekle and Kletzer (2003) and Brewer et al. (2003) attribute the poor economic growth to financial sector or 
banking sector problems. 
24 Basic Energy Plan may reduce the country’s reliance on nuclear power. 
25 Kanaya and Woo (2000) point out that the hesitation of authorities in implementing measures was caused by the 
fear that the banking sector would be plunged into a state of panic. 
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domestic lenders.  These are large financial institutions that are dependent on the Japanese 
government for continued protection (Kushida and Shimizu, 2013).  In this way the economy 
is protected from swings in the exchange rate and global financing conditions which would see 
the value of debt payments increase drastically. 
 
3.3.4. Portugal 
The Salazar era (Estado Novo26) left Portugal isolated from the global political scheme as the 
country’s third world status deepened in a European context.  The Carnation Revolution in 1974 
led to the restoration of democracy in Portugal.  Still, this rapid liberalisation and leadership 
confusion resulted in ‘democratic chaos’ as both political and economic plans failed under a 
wave of corruption and extremists.  Prime Minister Cavaco Silva denationalised the state-
owned banks and other public enterprises in 1989 as privatisation, economic deregulation and 
tax reform became the primary focus of public policy in the lead up to EU membership.  
Double-digit growth and low unemployment was achieved in Portugal in the late 1980s and the 
early 1990s as a large infusion of capital was used in an effort to rescue the economy.  Prime 
Minister Socrates was at the centre of the €78 billion bailout from the European troika as 
Portuguese unemployment soared, government bond yields reached double digit territory and 
the fiscal deficit increased.  This bailout resulted in higher taxes on corporate income. President 
Rebelo de Sousa was elected in 2016 and campaigned to heal the discord caused by the debt 
crisis of 2011 to 2014.  By the end of 2016, the Portuguese economy was the fastest growing 
in Europe. Today, both the political and economic situation of Portugal has stabilized as y-o-y 
growth continues to improve and unemployment reached a ten-year low of 8.5 percent in the 
third quarter of 2017. 
 
The Portuguese economy experienced strong growth between the 1930s and the early 1960s as 
the credit worthiness improved and the fiscal budget recovered.  In 1960, Portugal joined the 
EFTA; the following year Portugal joined the IMF and the World Bank; and in 1962, Portugal 
joined the GATT. Economic growth became even more important when guerrilla warfare 
threatened the stability of the Portuguese economy as well as the government’s budget.  In 
1974, the post dictatorship regime published its Economic and Social Program.  This program 
was not well defined and simply called for the reformation of the tax system and the 
 
26 The Estado Novo was established through the new constitution of 1933. 
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implementation of a new framework. The Portuguese government was forced to implement 
IMF-monitored stabilisation programs in both 1977 and 1983 as both the political and the 
economic environment remained unstable in the period after the revolution.  Prime Minister 
Cavaco Silva denationalised the state-owned banks and other public enterprises in 1989 as 
privatisation, economic deregulation and tax reform became the primary focus of public policy 
in the lead up to EC membership.  
 
In under two decades, the Portuguese economy has experienced major tests to its financial 
stability.  The Portuguese economy experienced a period of extreme expansion decreased 
between 1995 and 2001 as economic prospects bloomed and the investment risk.  This led to 
higher levels of private debt, improved labour productivity growth27 and a boom due to higher 
domestic demand.  However, this boom gave way to a severe bust and a decade of economic 
woes.  In 2002, Portugal started to experience stagnated GDP growth and declining investment 
as the country became less competitive and ever more indebted. By 2004, general government 
debt reached a level of 60 percent of GDP and by 2010, Portuguese sovereign bond interest 
rates followed the upward trend of Greek sovereign bond interest rates. In April 2011, the 
Portuguese economy received a rescue package from the troika made up of the IMF, EC and 
ECB.  Portuguese banks tightened lending standards and the government increased taxes in an 
effort to decrease public expenditure.  Portugal experienced mass emigration at levels that had 
not been experienced since the Salazar era.   
 
Although the views on Portugal’s recovery differ, I favour the view that the recovery is 
grounded in lasting structural changes over the two decades prior to recovery combined with 
policy initiatives which were aimed at fostering an environment of business and consumer 
confidence.28 On the other hand, the deflationary argument is counteracted by the skyrocketing 
home prices and rental costs that we have seen29.  In 2017, Portugal exited the EC’s excessive 
deficit procedure following improved growth, controlled budgets and falling interest costs.  Yet, 
Government debt was still amongst the highest in Europe.  Still, the country’s sovereign debt 
became eligible for inclusion in several international bond markets, which improves investment 
prospects and creates an opportunity to cover debt payments at a faster rate.  Low household 
 
27 See Corrado et al. (2016) 
28 See Gouveia and Coelho (2018) and Centeno and Coelho (2018) 
29 See Chen et al. (2012), ESM (2017), IMF (2017) and the EC (2016) 
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savings rates also pose a threat to Portuguese financial stability as Portugal has an aging 
population and a far-reaching social security system.  Yet simultaneously, households are 
highly indebted. The Portuguese banking sector is the most profitable it has been since the crisis 
as a series of recapitalisations which improved capital positions and cleaned up balance sheets 
has reduced the susceptibility of the banking sector to external shocks and hence, stabilised the 
banking sector (Sušec, 2019).  
 
3.3.5. The UK 
Margaret Thatcher was elected as British Prime Minister in 1979 after a period of stagflation30, 
extreme power of trade unions and incredibly high national debt resulted in the UK applying 
for an IMF bailout in 1976.  Although BoE independence was proposed by Conservative 
Chancellor Lawson in 1988 (Lawson, 1992), Hansard (1993) notes that Thatcher’s rejection of 
BoE operational independence was based on political motives as increasing interest rates would 
have affected homeowners who constituted the majority of the voting population.  Thatcher’s 
popularity started to decline after her second re-election in 1987 when a ‘Community Charge’31 
replaced the earlier local property taxes.  King (2003) concludes, “while policy makers will 
continue to focus on the signals they are receiving from this international audience, policies 
such as institutional reform will continue to be made on the basis of electoral calculations that 
reflect domestic interests.”  Theresa May took over as Prime Minister upon David Cameron’s 
resignation in 2016.  Her term was marred by a “lack of integration and inadequate legitimacy” 
(Grubb, 2019) as the electorate remained deeply divided and a solution and strategy to Brexit 
remained unattainable for an extended period of time.  The uncertainty surrounding Brexit and 
the global political shift towards the right while liberal beliefs are abandoned, presents an ever-
increasing risk to the UK and global political freedom.  The UK’s political system is likely to 
revolve around Brexit in the future as attaining political stability may take years in the aftermath 
of the UK’s exit from the EU. 
  
EC membership clearly played an important role in halting the economic decline relative to the 
EU6 that the UK was experiencing at the time.32 Globalisation led to renewed international 
 
30 Economic stagnation combined with high inflation 
31 This ‘Community Charge’ was a “flat individual charge on all adult residents, regardless of income, to pay for 
local services.  The poll was introduced in Scotland in 1989 and in England and Wales in 1990.” (Lauderdale, 
2015) 
32 Between 1973 and 2010, the GDP per capita ratio was stable (Campos and Coricelli, 2015). 
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pressure for governments to implement prudent economic policies.  The return of the Labour 
party in 1997, saw economic stability, low inflation, low borrowing levels and the promotion 
of private enterprises take centre stage.  In the aftermath of the GFC, the UK offered both 
political and economic stability in a turbulent global environment.  However, in 2014 the UK 
had the largest current account and budget deficits in Europe relative to GDP and political and 
economic uncertainty emerged as the UK prepared for a referendum on UK independence from 
the EU.  Aiyar (2011) shows that British banks experienced a decline in local lending after the 
Lehman Brothers default due to lower levels of foreign funding.33  More recently, economic 
growth34 has been strong, wages have been on the rise and foreign investment has maintained 
a high level.  Even so, the threat of a bursting housing bubble remains imminent, public services 
pay demands continue to increase and political and economic uncertainty in the face of Brexit 
remains a concern.  
 
3.4. An Empirical Analysis 
We use a regression to substantiate our discussion on the importance of Central Banks. Romelli 
(2018) constructs a comprehensive index of Central Bank Independence using the Grilli et al. 
(1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992) GMT and CWN indices as a starting point.  The Romelli 
(2018) Extended Central Bank Independence (ECBI) index includes information on the 1.) 
Governor and Central Bank board, 2.) Monetary policy and conflicts resolution, 3.) Objectives, 
4.) Limitations on lending to the government, 5.) Financial independence and lastly, 6.) 
Reporting and accountability.  The ECBI index included in the Romelli (2018) paper covers 
154 countries for the period of 1972 to 2017.  The dataset provided to me by Davide Romelli35 
covers an earlier period for Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK.  Hence, my empirical 
analysis focuses on the period between 1962 and 2017 (full sample) and the period between 
1990 and 2017 (VIX restricted sample). The CBI index, as coded by Romelli (2018), ranges 
from zero to one with one representing the highest level of CBI.  
 
33 See Rose and Wieladek (2011) and Kamil and Rai (2010). 
34 Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) show that quantitative easing in the UK may have provided a temporary boost to real 
GDP of about 2 percent. 
35 Romelli (2018) covers an extensive period as well as an extensive country set, this data is not yet available 
publicly.  The data for the extended time period (1962 to 2017) and the country set (Chile, Colombia, Japan, 
Portugal and the UK) covered in this chapter was provided to me by Davide Romelli on request and hence, the 
analysis focuses on five country cases specifically. The countries chosen are by no means assumed to be a 
representative group instead, the countries are analysed on a case by case basis with the panel of five countries 
simply being included for completeness.  The regression equations (1 to 3) are firstly applied to the panel of five 
countries and then to the five individual country cases. 
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The regression equations are as follows:  
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖 + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β3ECBIit-1 + β4yit-1 + β5vixt-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖 + β2Credit_Growth it-1*ECBIit-1 + β4yit-1 + β5vixt-1 + β6yit-1*ECBIit-1 + 
β7vixt-1*ECBIit-1  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖  + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β2Credit_Growth it-1*ECBIit-1 + β3ECBIit-1+ 
β4yit-1 + β5vixt-1 + β6yit-1*ECBIit-1 + β7vixt-1*ECBIit-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
where, Credit_Growthit is the annual growth in the level of credit and ECBI is the level of the 
ECBI index, yit is the annual GDP growth rate, vixt is the level of the volatility index, 𝜑𝑖 are 
country fixed effects to account for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a 
disturbance term satisfying the standard conditions of zero mean and constant variance.  Both 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the relationship between the credit growth rate and the GDP growth 
rate between 1962 and 2017.  The credit growth measure in Figure 2 is domestic credit to the 
private sector, while the credit growth measure in Figure 3 is domestic credit by deposit banks 
and other financial institutions. The correlation between domestic credit to the private sector 
and GDP growth is -0.0089 and the correlation between domestic credit by deposit banks and 
other financial institutions and GDP growth is -0.1978 when considering the entire period. The 
graphs show that credit and GDP have similar growth paths in recent years, and GDP growth 
is included in the analysis due to the relationship between the two fundamentals. 
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Figure 2 - GDP Growth vs. Growth in Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
 
Data Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 3 - GDP Growth vs. Growth in Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions 
 
Data Source: World Bank 
 
The analysis is repeated for two measures of credit growth namely, domestic credit to the 
private sector and domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions.  Credit 
growth acts as a proxy for financial stability as financial crises are often preceded by credit and 
asset growth (Borio, 2018).  As such, we are able to study the impact of CBI on financial 
stability. 
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The results of our statistical tests are included in Appendices. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests for the presence of a unit root shows that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of the 
presence of a unit root for the lagged level of ECBI.  The absence of a unit root implies that the 
effect of a shock dissipates over time.  In the case of the level of CBI, this may not be the case.  
The presence of a unit root is rejected for the lagged credit growth, the lagged GDP growth and 
the lagged level of VIX.  The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation shows that the panel does 
indeed suffer from serial correlation for both domestic credit to the private sector and domestic 
credit to deposit banks and other financial institutions.   
 
The Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity shows that the panel also suffers from 
heteroskedasticity, the main panel results (Table 2 and Table 3) therefore include corrections 
for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity 
shows that heteroskedasticity is not an issue in the individual country cases.  The Durbin-
Watson test for autocorrelation shows that there is no first order autocorrelation in the majority 
of cases with the exception being the third regression for the case of Colombia when 
considering domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions and the third 
regression for the case of Japan when considering domestic credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions.  Therefore, the main results for the country cases (Table 8 and Table 9) 
include unadjusted fixed effects regression results for all cases except the third regression for 
the cases of Colombia and Japan, in these two cases, the results are corrected for serial 
correlation.  The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, namely credit growth, in the first 
and third regression equation may result in Nickell Bias in the panel.  A robustness check 
available in appendices shows results in which this issue is corrected for using the LSDV 
methodology, the results show that there are no coefficient sign changes except for the case of 
lagged domestic credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions for the first 
regression.  The magnitude of the coefficient is not of importance in this empirical analysis.36 
 
Table 8 shows the results of regressing growth in domestic credit to the private sector on its 
lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of 
VIX (with country fixed effects). When domestic credit to the private sector is regressed on the 
ECBI index in the panel, the coefficient is negative.  However, this coefficient is only 
 
36 The changes in magnitude are not noticeable for the majority of cases.   
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statistically significant in the third regression equation.  The coefficient on the interaction term 
between domestic credit growth and the level of the ECBI is positive and statistically significant 
for the cases of the UK and Portugal for the second regression equation.  Table 9 shows the 
results of regressing growth in domestic credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions on its lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index, lagged GDP growth and 
the lagged level of VIX (with country fixed effects).  The coefficient on the interaction term 
between domestic credit growth and the level of the ECBI is positive and statistically significant 
for the case of the UK for the third regression equation.  Romelli (2018) finds that the political 
environment and institutional setting do not play an important role in the likelihood of reforms 
of CBI and that financial crises tend to result in reforms aimed at reducing CBI.  Our results 
show that credit growth and ECBI move in the same direction.  Hence, higher level of CBI 
results in higher levels of credit supply.  In times of financial stress when credit supply is 
growing exponentially and credit conditions show signs of overheating, CBI may need to be 
reined back in an effort to slow down credit supply, this substantiates the view of Romelli 
(2018). 
 
A number of robustness checks are included in Appendices.  Additional domestic credit growth 
regressions including corrections for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation as well as 
domestic credit growth regressions focusing on the period after the GFC of 2008 are included.  
Further, we also include robustness checks using private credit by deposit banks and private 
credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions are also included.  The coefficient on the 
interaction term between private credit growth and the ECBI is positive for the majority of 
robustness checks when considering the panel for the second regression.  The same holds for 
the domestic credit growth measures.  In the cases where the coefficient is statistically 
significant, the sign is positive, in line with the main results in Table 8 and Table 9.  A few 
exceptions to the rule include the regression results for the cases in which serial correlation is 
corrected for when considering domestic credit measures for regression equation two and the 
sign on the coefficient of the interaction term is negative for the case of the UK.  The positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between credit growth and the 
ECBI index indicates that for higher levels of CBI, the impact on credit growth is larger.  This 
implies that in times of financial instability, CBI would be reined back in an effort to re-
establish financial stability. 
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3.4.1. Regression Results: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
Table 8 - Regression Results: Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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3.4.2. Regression Results: Domestic Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions 
Table 9 - Regression Results: Domestic Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   




The views on the CBI of EMEs vary with Garriga (2016) stating that the move towards 
independence has been more stable while, Crowe and Meade (2007) believe that an impressive 
shift in CBI has taken place over the past two decades.  However, there is a consensus view 
Chapter 3: The Role of Central Banks and the Political Environment in Financial Stability:  
 A Few Case Studies 
 
94 
that CBI has the ability to stabilise the economy. The countries discussed all have Central Banks 
that are somewhat autonomous.  Banco Central de Chile’s autonomy was legalised in 1975, 
Banco de la República’s level of autonomy was increased in 1992 and Banco de Portugal 
became autonomous in 1998 after being nationalised in 1974. Both the Bank of England and 
the Bank of Japan became autonomous in 1997 although the Bank of Japan still acts as a 
government’s bank. 
 
Although Romelli (2018) concludes that the political and institutional setting does not influence 
the introduction of Central Bank reforms, I tend to disagree. As Clark et al. (1998) point out, 
politicians may favour control over monetary policy when they are seeking additional voter 
support. In the Latin American countries considered, improved political freedom and stability 
has resulted in more trade.  This has led to improved economic growth and financial stability. 
In the UK and Portugal, the political history has indeed influenced both the Central Banks and 
financial stability. Central Bank autonomy was rejected for a number of years in the UK due to 
the potential negative consequences on the political powers, Portugal saw its Central Bank 
being nationalised after the fall of the Estado Novo and autonomy was only granted when 
political stability was re-established. 
 
In this chapter, the institutional setting and the structure and functioning of Central Banks in 
Chile, Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK is considered. The political environment and the 
financial stability is then discussed and the discussion is substantiated with a brief empirical 
analysis of the effect of CBI on credit growth using an existing database created by Romelli 
(2018).  Our main results show that there is a positive relationship between credit growth and 
the level of CBI.  Our robustness checks show that the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant for a number of cases when implementing a variety of estimation methods.  
Fluctuations in credit growth are larger for higher levels of CBI.  Hence, in periods of financial 
instability or ultimately financial crises, CBI would be reined back in an effort to re-establish 
financial stability.  In times of surging credit supply, policy makers should attempt to decrease 
the level of CBI in countries with highly independent.  At the same time, less independent 
Central Banks should be wary of reducing independence.  Instead, these Central Banks should 
increase independence.  As such, there should be a threshold level of Central Bank 
independence to ensure financial stability.    
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3.6. Appendix I 
I.1. Summary Statistics 
Table I1 - Summary Statistics 
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I.2. Variable Definitions 
Table I2 - Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Name Code Indicator Name Long definition Source 
ECBI 
  
Extended Central Bank 
Independence index that 
provides information on 
central bank institutional 
design across six 
dimensions: 1) 
Governor and central 
bank board, 2) Monetary 
policy and conicts 
resolution, 3) 
Objectives, 4) 
Limitations on lending 
to the government, 5) 
Financial independence 





GDP growth (annual %) Annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on 
constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on 
constant 2010 US 
dollars. GDP is the sum 
of gross value added by 
all resident producers in 
the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not 
included in the value of 
the products. It is 
calculated without 
making deductions for 
depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for 
depletion and 
degradation of natural 
resources. 
World Bank national 
accounts data, and 
OECD National 
Accounts data files. 
VIX VIXCLS  Level of the volatility 
index (annual average) 
VIX measures market 
expectation of near term 
volatility conveyed by 
stock index option 
prices. 




GFDD.DI.12  Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions to 
GDP (%)  
Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions to 
GDP, calculated using 
the following deflation 
method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et 
+ Ft-1/P_et-
1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where 
F is credit to the private 
sector, P_e is end-of 
period CPI, and P_a is 
average annual CPI. 
Raw data are from the 
electronic version of the 
IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. 
Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions 
(IFS lines 22d, 42d, 
FOSAOP and FFSAP); 
GDP in local currency 
(IFS line NGDP); end-
of period CPI (IFS line 




Fund (IMF)  
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annual CPI is calculated 
using the monthly CPI 




Growth in Private credit 
by deposit money banks 
and other financial 




World Bank Data 
PrivateCreditDeposit  GFDD.DI.01  Private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP 
(%)  
Private credit by deposit 
money banks and other 
financial institutions to 
GDP, calculated using 
the following deflation 
method:  {(0.5)*[Ft/P_et 
+ Ft-1/P_et-
1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where 
F is credit to the private 
sector, P_e is end-of 
period CPI, and P_a is 
average annual CPI. 
Raw data are from the 
electronic version of the 
IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics.  
Private credit by deposit 
money banks (IFS line 
22d and FOSAOP); 
GDP in local currency 
(IFS line NGDP); end-
of period CPI, (IFS line 
PCPI); and average 
annual CPI is calculated 
using the monthly CPI 








Growth in Private credit 
by deposit money banks 










Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP) 
  
Domestic credit to 
private sector refers to 
financial resources 
provided to the private 
sector by financial 
corporations, such as 
through loans, purchases 
of nonequity securities, 
and trade credits and 
other accounts 
receivable, that establish 
a claim for 
repayment. For some 
countries these claims 




authorities and deposit 
money banks, as well as 
other financial 
corporations where data 
are available (including 
corporations 
that do not accept 
transferable deposits but 
do incur such liabilities 
as time and savings 




Financial Statistics and 
data files, and World 
Bank and OECD GDP 
estimates. 
Portugal 1961 to 1968 
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corporations are finance 
and leasing companies, 
money lenders, 
insurance corporations, 






Growth in Domestic 
credit to private sector 











provided by financial 
sector (% of GDP) 
  
Domestic credit 
provided by the 
financial sector includes 
all credit to various 
sectors on a gross basis, 
with the exception of 
credit to the central 
government, which is 
net. 
The financial sector 
includes monetary 
authorities and deposit 
money banks, as well as 
other financial 
corporations where data 
are available (including 
corporations that do not 
accept transferable 
deposits but do 
incur such liabilities as 
time and savings 
deposits). Examples of 
other financial 
corporations are finance 
and leasing companies, 
money lenders, 
insurance corporations, 





Financial Statistics and 
data files, and World 






Growth in Domestic 
credit provided by 
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3.7. Appendix J 
J.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for the Presence of a Unit Root 
Table J1 - Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test results based on: Ho: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel 
is stationary.  The results of an Inverse Chi-squared (2) test are presented in the above table with both the Test 
Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted.  The presence of a unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value 
< 0.1. 
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J.2. Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin Watson Test for 
Autocorrelation: Domestic Credit Measures 
Table J2 - Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation: Domestic Credit Measures 
 
Note: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No First-Order Autocorrelation and Ha: First 
Order Autocorrelation.  The results of the F-test and the corresponding p-values are presented in the above table.  
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No Autocorrelation and Ha: Positive Autocorrelation or 
Inconclusive Results.  The Durbin Watson Test Statistic is quoted in the table above, the upper and lower Durbin 
Watson bounds from Savin and White at a 1% Confidence Interval are also quoted in the above table.  Test Statistic 
values above the upper bound result in the null hypothesis not being rejected and hence, no positive serial 
correlation is present.  A Test Statistic below the lower bound results in the assumption that positive serial 
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J.3. Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: Domestic Credit Measures 
Table J3 - Results of Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: Domestic Credit 
Measures 
 
Note: Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity results based on: Ho: No Heteroskedasticity present and Ha: 
Heteroskedasticity present.  The results of a Chi-squared (1) test are presented in the above table with both the 
Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted.  The absence of Heteroskedasticity is rejected for the cases 
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J.4. Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin Watson Test for 
Autocorrelation: Private Credit Measures 
Table J4 - Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation: Private Credit Measures 
 
Note: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No First-Order Autocorrelation and Ha: First 
Order Autocorrelation.  The results of the F-test and the corresponding p-values are presented in the above table.  
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No Autocorrelation and Ha: Positive Autocorrelation or 
Inconclusive Results.  The Durbin Watson Test Statistic is quoted in the table above, the upper and lower Durbin 
Watson bounds from Savin and White at a 1% Confidence Interval are also quoted in the above table.  Test 
Statistic values above the upper bound result in the null hypothesis not being rejected and hence, no positive 
serial correlation is present.  A Test Statistic below the lower bound results in the assumption that positive serial 
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J.5. Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: Private Credit Measures 
Table J5 - Results of Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: Private Credit 
Measures 
 
Note: Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity results based on: Ho: No Heteroskedasticity present and Ha: 
Heteroskedasticity present.  The results of a Chi-squared (1) test are presented in the above table with both the 
Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted.  The absence of Heteroskedasticity is rejected for the cases 
where the p-value < 0.1. 
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J.6. Additional: GDP Growth vs. Credit Growth (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) 
Figure J6 - GDP Growth vs. Credit Growth (Domestic Credit to Private Sector) for The 
United Kingdom, Japan and Portugal 
 
Note: Country 1 = Chile, Country 2 = Chile, Country 3 = United Kingdom, Country 4 = Japan, Country 5 = 
Portugal. 
 
J.7. Additional: GDP Growth vs. Credit Growth (Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions) 
Figure J7 - GDP Growth vs. Credit Growth (Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions) for Chile, Colombia, The UK, Japan and Portugal 
 
Note: Country 1 = Chile, Country 2 = Chile, Country 3 = United Kingdom, Country 4 = Japan, Country 5 = 
Portugal. 
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J.8. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (No 
Corrections) 
Table J8 shows the results of regressing growth in domestic credit to the private sector on its 
lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index, lagged GDP growth and the lagged level of 
VIX (with country fixed effects).  When domestic credit to the private sector is regressed on 
the ECBI index in the panel, the coefficient is negative.  This coefficient is only statistically 
significant in the third regression equation.  The coefficient is positive for the case of Japan and 
Colombia in the third regression equation and the coefficient is negative in the case of the UK 
and Portugal.  However, this coefficient is still not statistically significant.  The coefficient on 
lagged GDP growth is statistically significant in the case of Colombia with the coefficient 
having a positive sign in the first and third regressions.  However, the coefficient has a negative 
sign in the second regression.  The coefficient on the interaction term between credit growth 
and the ECBI index is positive and statistically significant in the second regression in the case 
of the panel, the UK and Portugal and in the case of Colombia in the third regression. 
 
Table J9 shows the results of regressing domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions on its lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index, lagged GDP growth and 
the lagged level of VIX (with country fixed effects).  The coefficient on the interaction term 
between credit growth and ECBI is positive and statistically significant in the second regression 
for the cases of Chile, the UK and Portugal while the coefficient is only positive and statistically 
significant in the case of the UK in the third regression.  The positive and statistically significant 
sign on the coefficient of the interaction term between credit growth and ECBI in the cases of 
the UK and Portugal in the second regression is therefore consistent when considering both 
domestic credit to the private sector in Table J8 as well domestic credit by deposit banks and 
other financial institutions in Table J9.   
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Table J8 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (No Corrections) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
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J.9. Additional Credit Growth Regression Domestic Credit by Deposit Money Banks 
and Other Financial Institutions (No Corrections) 
Table J9 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression Domestic Credit by Deposit 
Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions (No Corrections) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.10 Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector, VIX 
excluded (No Corrections) 
Regression equations (4) to (6) do not include the level of the VIX index in an effort to extend 
the sample period while regression equations (1) to (3) include the level of the VIX index and 
hence, the sample for regression equations (1) to (3) covers the period between 1990 and 2017 
while, the sample for regression equations (4) to (6) covers the period between 1962 and 2017.  
Table J10 shows the results of regressing domestic credit to the private sector growth on its 
lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index and lagged GDP growth (with country fixed 
effects).  When domestic credit to the private sector is regression on the interaction term 
between domestic credit growth and ECBI, the coefficient has a positive and statistically 
significant sign in the cases of the panel, Chile, Japan and Portugal in the second regression.  
 
Table J11 shows the results of regressing domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions growth on its lagged value, the lagged value of the ECBI index and lagged GDP 
growth (with country fixed effects).  The coefficient on the interaction term between domestic 
credit growth and ECBI is positive and statistically significant in the second regression equation 
in the cases of the UK and Portugal.  This result is in line with the results of Table J9 where the 
same credit measure is included in regression equations (1) to (3) with the lagged level of VIX 
included.  In these cases, the inclusion (or exclusion) of the lagged level of the volatility index 
does not affect the regression results. 
 
The regression equations are as follows:  
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖 + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β3ECBIit-1 + β4yit-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖 + β2Credit_Growth it-1*ECBIit-1 + β4yit-1 + β6yit-1*ECBIit-1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡  (5) 
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖  + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β2Credit_Growth it-1*ECBIit-1 + β3ECBIit-1+ 
β4yit-1 + β6yit-1*ECBIit-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
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Table J10 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector, VIX excluded (No Corrections) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test. The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
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J.11. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions, VIX excluded (No Corrections) 
Table J11 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions, VIX excluded (No Corrections) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.12. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
(Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
Table J12 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.13. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
Table J13 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation Controlled For) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.14. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
(Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For), VIX excluded 
Table J14 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For), VIX excluded 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
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J.15. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For), 
VIX excluded 
Table J15 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation Controlled For), VIX excluded 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.16. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (xtregar 
with Fixed Effects) 
Table J16 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (xtregar with Fixed Effects) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.17. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (xtregar with Fixed Effects) 
Table J17 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (xtregar with Fixed Effects) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.18. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (Dummy 
Included for Post Crisis Period) 
Table J18 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.19. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
Table J19 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Dummy Included for Post Crisis 
Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.20. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
(Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, Dummy Included for Post 
Crisis Period)  
Table J20 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, Dummy Included for 
Post Crisis Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.21. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, 
Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period)  
Table J21 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial 
Correlation Controlled For, Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.22. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks  
Table J22 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.23. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions 
Table J23 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.24. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks 
(Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
Table J24 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.25. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For) 
Table J25 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
Controlled For) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.  * Represents 
statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to cointegration. 
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J.26. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks (Dummy 
Included for Post Crisis Period) 
Table J26 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks (Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
  
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.27. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions (Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
Table J27 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
  
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.28. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks 
(Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, Dummy Included for Post 
Crisis Period) 
Table J28 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, Dummy Included for 
Post Crisis Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.29. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation Controlled For, 
Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
Table J29 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Private Credit by Deposit 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
Controlled For, Dummy Included for Post Crisis Period) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.30. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private Sector (xtlsdvc) 
Table J30 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector (xtlsdvc) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
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J.31. Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by Deposit Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions (xtlsdvc) 
Table J31 - Results of Additional Credit Growth Regression: Domestic Credit by 
Deposit Banks and Other Financial Institutions (xtlsdvc) 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration.  
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J.32. Detailed Description of the Romelli (2018) ECBI Index 
Table J32 - Table Summarizing the Set of Information Collected in the GMT, CWN and 
ECBI Indices 
 











Aiyar, S. 2011: How did the crisis in international funding markets affect bank lending?
 Balance sheet evidence from the UK. Bank of England Working Paper 424, Bank of
 England, Threadneedle Street: London, United Kingdom. 
Berman, S and McNamara, KR. 1999: Bank on Democracy: Why Central Banks Need Public
 Oversight. Foreign Affairs 78 (March/April): 2-8. 
Bernhard, W. 1998: A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence.
 American Political Science Review 92 (June): 311-327. 
Bernhard, W. 2002: Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank
 Independence in the Industrial Democracies. University of Michigan Press: Ann
 Arbor, Michigan, U.S. 
Bernhard, W and Leblang, D. 2002: Political Parties and Monetary Commitments.
 International Organization 56:803-30. 
Birch, K. 2017: What exactly is neoliberalism? November 2, 2017,
 https://theconversation.com/what-exactly-is-neoliberalism-84755, accessed on: 19
 April 2019. 
Bodea, C and Hicks, R. 2015: International Finance and Central Bank Independence:
 Institutional Diffusion and the Flow and Cost of Capital. Journal of Politics 77:268
 -284. 
Borio, C. 2018: The financial cycle and recession risk. BIS Quarterly Review (December),
 Bank of International Settlements: Basel, Switzerland. 
Brewer, E (III), Genay, H, Hunter, WC and Kaufman, GG. 2003: The Value of Banking
 Relationships during a Financial Crisis: Evidence from Failures of Japanese Banks.
 Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 17(3): 233-226.
Campos, N and Coricelli, F. 2015: Why did Britain join the EU? A new insight from
 economic history. VOX CEPR Policy Portal, 3 February 2015,





 accessed on: 18 May 2019. 
Carrasquilla, A, A, AG and Vasquez, DM. 2000: El gran apreton crediticio en colombia: una
 interpretacion. Coyuntura Economica 30: 107-115. 
Centeno, M and Coelho, MC. 2018: The turnaround of the Portuguese economy: Two 
 decades of structural changes. VOX CEPR Policy Portal, 6 June 2018, 
 https://voxeu.org/article/turnaround-portuguese-economy, accessed on: 9 May 
 2019. 
Chen, R, Milesi-Ferretti, G and Tressel, T. 2012: External imbalances in the euro area.
 IMF Working Paper WP/12/236, Interntaional Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. 
Clark, WR, Reichert, U, Lomas, S and Parker, K. 1998: International and domestic
 constraints on political business cycles in OECD countries. International
 Organization 52(1): 87-120. 
Clark, WR, Golder, SN, and Poast, P. 2013: Monetary Institutions and the Political
 Survival of Democratic Leaders. International Studies Quarterly 57:556-67. 
Corrado, C, Haskel, J, Cecilia, JL and Massimiliano, I. 2016: Intangible investment in the EU
 and US before and since the Great Recession and its contribution to productivity
 growth.  EIB Working Paper 2016/08, European Investment Bank: Luxembourg. 
Crowe, C, and Meade, EE. 2007: The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the
 World. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21:69-90. 
Cukierman, A. 1992: Central Bank strategy, credibility, and independence: theory and
 evidence. The MIT Press: Cambridge, U.S. 
Cukierman, A. 2008: Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions
 - Past, Present and Future.  European Journal of Political Economy 24:722-236. 
Cukierman, A, Miller, GP and Neyapti, B. 2002: Central Bank Reform, Liberalization, and
 Inflation in Transition Economies. An International Perspective. Journal of Monetary
 Economics 49:237–264. 
Cukierman, A, Webb, SB and Neyapti, B. 1992: Measuring the Independence of Central
 Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcome. The World Bank Economic Review 6:353-
 398. 
Debelle, G and Fischer, S. 1995: How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? Conference
 Series [Proceedings] 38: 195-225,




 https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:1994:p:195-225:n:38, accessed on:
 10 April 2020. 
De Haas, R, Korniyenko, Y, Loukoianova, E and Pivovarsky, A. 2011: Foreign Banks
 during the Crisis: Saints or Sinners? IMF Working Paper WP/12/117, International
 Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. 
De Haas, R and Van Lelyveld, I. 2006: Foreign Banks and Credit Stability in Central and
 Eastern Europe: Friends or Foes? Journal of Banking and Finance 30 (7): 1927-1952. 
Dekle, R and Kletzer, K. 2003: The Japanese Banking Crisis and Economic Growth:
 Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Deposit Guarantees and Weak Financial
 Regulation. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 17(3): 305-335,
 Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
European Commission. 2016: Ex post evaluation of the economic adjustment programme
 Portugal, 2011–2016: European Commission Institutional Paper 040(November),
 European Commission: Brussels, Belgium. 
Eijffinger, SCW and de Haan, J. 1996: The political economy of central-bank
 independence. Princeton Studies in International Economics, International Economics
 Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University: Princeton, U.S. 
ESM. 2017: EFSF/ESM Financial Assistance – Evaluation Report. European Stability
 Mechanism: Luxembourg,
 https://www.esm.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ti_pubpdf_dw0616055enn_pdfweb_20
 70607111409.pdf, accessed on: 11 April 2020. 
Fernández-Albertos, J. 2015: The Politics of Central Bank Independence. Annual Review of
 Political Science 18: 217-237. 
Garriga, AC. 2016: Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set.
 International Interactions 42 (5): 849-868. 
Gouveia, A and Coelho, MC. 2018: The Portuguese economy: Short essays on structural
 changes. Gabinete de Planeamento, Estratégia, Avaliação e Relações
 Internacionais, Ministry of Finance: Lisbon, Portugal. 
Grilli, V, Masciandaro, D, and Tabellini, G. 1991: Political and monetary institutions 
and public financial policies in the industrial countries. Economic Policy 6 (13):
 342-392. 
Grubb, M. 2019: Brexit Has Turned From A Major National Decision To A Crisis That Risks
 The UK's Political Stability.  The Blog, Huffington Post,









 B7_5EoIkD9N9vxhDB7t6LUVoQ3KVS0nGDY2CNxhGYc1EptBr8, accessed 7 June
 2020. 
Hansard. 1993: Parliamentary Papers 1993/94 – Debate on BoE (Amendment) Bill. HMSO:
 London, United Kingdom. 
Hennart, JF. 1988: A transaction costs theory of equity joint ventures. Strategic
 Management Journal 9(4): 361–374. 
Hoshi, T and Okazaki, T. 2002: Bank Management in the 1980s: In: Studies of the
 Heisei Bubble, Muramatsu and Okuno (eds.), Toyo-Keizai Shinpo-Sha: Tokyo, Japan. 
IMF. 2017: Portugal - Fifth Post Program Monitoring Discussions - Press Release; Staff
 Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Portugal. 22 February,
 European Department, International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. 
Ito, T. 1990: The Timing of Elections and Political Business Cycles in Japan. Journal of
 Asian Economics 1: 135-146. 
Kamil, H and Rai, K. 2010: The Global Credit Crunch and Foreign Banks’ lending to
 EMs: Why did Latin America fare better? IMF Working Paper WP/10/102,
 International Monetary Fund: Washington, D.C. 
Kanaya, A and Woo, D. 2000: The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources and
 Lessons. IMF Working Paper WP/00/7, International Monetary Fund: Washington,
 D.C. 
Keohane, RO and Milner, HV. 1996: Internationalization and domestic politics. Cambridge
 University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
Kim, WC and Hwang, P. 1992: Global strategy and multinationals’ entry mode choice.
 Journal of International Business Studies 3(1): 29–53. 
King, MR. 2003: Distributional Politics and Central Bank Independence: New Labour’s
 Reform of the Bank of England. March 2003,
 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.6248&rep=rep1
 type=pdf, accessed on: 19 April 2019. 




Kushida, KE and Shimizu, K. 2013: Overview: Japan's Political and Economic
 Transformations Since the 1990s. In: Kushida, KE, Shimizu, K and Oi, JC.
 Syncretism: the politics of economic restructuring and system reform in Japan, The
 Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center: Stanford. CA: Chapter 2. 
Laeven, L and Valencia, F. 2012: Systematic Banking Crises Database: An Update.
 IMF Working Paper WP/12/163, Washington, D.C. 
Lauderdale, B. 2015: A Brief Political History of the United Kingdom. FiveThirtyEight, 25
 March 2015, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/a-brief-political history-of-the-united
 kingdom/, accessed on: 18 May 2019. 
Lawson, N. 1992: The view from no.11: memoirs of a Tory radical. Bantam Press: London. 
Marshall, J. 2003: Fiscal Rule and Central Bank Issues in Chile. In: Fiscal Issues and Central
 Banking in EMEs: 98-106. BIS Papers No. 20, Bank for International
 Settlements: Basel, Switzerland. 
Maxfield, S. 1997: Gatekeepers of growth: the international political economy of Central
 Banking in developing countries. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J. 
Mosley, L. 2000: Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare
 States. International Organization 54 (4): 737-773. 
Navaretti, GB, Calzolari, G, Pozzolo, AF and Levi, M. 2010: Multinational Banking in
 Europe: Financial Stability and Regulatory Implications and Lessons from the
 Financial Crisis. Economic Policy 25 (64), 703–753. 
Persson, T and Tabellini, G. 1990: Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics. Harwood
 Publishers: London. 
Rawdanowicz, L, Bouis, R, Kei-Ichiro, I and Christensen, A. 2014: Secular Stagnation:
 Evidence and Implications for Economic Policy. OECD Economics Department
 Working Papers 1169: OECD Publishing. 
Rodriguez-Delgado JD, Arregui, N and Wu, Y. 2013: Chile – Selected Issues. 
 IMF Country Report 13/199: International Monetary Fund, July 2013. 
Rogoff, KS. 1985: The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary
 Target.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:1169-1189. 
Romelli, D. 2018: The political economy of reforms in Central Bank design: evidence
 from a new dataset. BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2018-87, 
 BAFFI CAREFIN, Bocconi University: Milan, Italy. 




Rose, A and Wieladek, T. 2011: Financial protectionism: the first tests. External MPV Unit
 Discussion Paper (32): Bank of England, London. 
Rosenbluth, FM and Thies, MF. 2010: Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic
 Restructuring. Princeton University Press: Princeton, U.S. 
Shan, W. 1991: Environmental risks and joint venture sharing arrangements. Journal of
 International Business Studies 22(4): 555–578. 
Sušec, M. 2019: The Portuguese economy: a long-term creditor’s perspective. Keynote
 speech, Fitch Credit Outlook: Lisbon, 24 January 2019, 
 https://www.esm.europa.eu/speeches-and-presentations/portuguese-economy
 long-term-creditor’s-perspective-speech-matjaž-sušec, accessed: 21 May 2019. 
Tenjo, F and Lopez, E. 2002: Globalization of Equity Markets and the Cost of Capital.
 Revista del Banco de la República 75(898): 26-73, Agosto 2002. 
Uribe, JD. 2012: How can macro-prudential policies or frameworks for financial stability be
 designed to preserve the credibility of monetary policy to keep inflation low?
 Reflections from a commodity exporting, small open economy. Participation
 notes for the High-Level Conference on “Macroprudential Policies to Achieve
 Financial Stability", Organized by the Banco Central del Uruguay and the IMF,
 https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2012/macro/pdf/uribe.pdf, accessed:
 9 April 2020. 
Vernon, R. 1983: Organizational and institutional responses to international risk.  In R. J.
 Herring (ed.), Managing International Risk. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
 U.K. 
Villar Gómez, L, Salamanca Rojas, DM and Murcia Pabón, A. 2005: Crédito, repression
 financiera y flujos de capitales en Colombia: 1974-2003. Revista Desarrollo y























The deregulation of the US financial system in the time leading up to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) and the subsequent growth of the ‘Shadow Banking’ system resulted in the 
spurred use of complex derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDSs) and collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) as well as the rapid growth of both the US housing market and the 
market for subprime mortgages. When extremely high home prices were no longer supported, 
prices plummeted and a severe credit freeze ensued in both the US and in the global economy. 
European banks had substantial balance sheet exposures to the US housing market and both 
public and private debt in many European countries skyrocketed, Latin American commodity 
exporting countries were affected by the weaker US dollar and the drop in external demand 
severely impacted the Japanese economy. The unexpected interconnectedness, vulnerabilities 
and the general contagion that encompassed the GFC confirmed the notion that an alternative 
policy framework needed to be implemented in an effort to manage financial instability and 
the ideal solution was the implementation of a comprehensive macroprudential policy 
framework.   
 
Crockett (2000), FSB/IMF/BIS (2011) and IMF (2013) state that macroprudential policy is the 
use of prudential tools in an effort to limit systematic risk and although macroprudential policy 
 




tools were included in the policy frameworks of emerging economies well before the crisis, 
macroprudential policy use is now broader as the crisis experience prompted its inclusion in 
policy frameworks.    In 2017, Vítor Constâncio38 said that “macroprudential policy emerged 
from the crisis as a new tool to deal with systemic risk in the financial sector… A new authority 
was needed to be accountable and responsible for monitoring and preventing the build-up of 
endogenous systemic risk in the financial sector.”  The recognition that the system was not 
fortified by the micro-supervision of individual institutions and instead was exposed to back 
door weaknesses such as financial stability led to the emergence of a new realm of policy.  
Galati and Moessner (2011) identify two main ingredients for the implementation of a 
successful macroprudential policy framework.  Firstly, the financial system “must be robust to 
external shocks” (Allen and Wood, 2006) and secondly, the financial system must be “resilient 
to shocks originating within the financial system” (Houben et. al., 2004). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of macroprudential policy through three veins 
of financial stability for both an EU panel as well as a Latin American panel.  A case study is 
also considered focusing on Japan, Portugal and the UK. An index of domestic macroprudential 
policy tools is constructed and the effectiveness of these tools in controlling credit growth, GDP 
growth and inflation growth is studied using a dynamic panel data model for the period between 
2000 and 2017. A monthly index, iMaPP database constructed by Alam et al. (2019), of 
macroprudential policy tools implemented in the relevant countries is used as a starting point.  
This index is coded through 2016:Q4, and is then cross checked using the Cerutti et al. (2017) 
index and extended using both the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey and the IMF 
Macroprudential Data Query report. The monthly index is cumulated to create the quarterly 
database used in this paper.  This index is used to analyse the ability of macroprudential policy 
tools to bridle excessive credit growth, the impact of policy tools on GDP growth and lastly, 
the effect that macroprudential policy tools have on inflation growth in an effort to fully capture 
the impact of macroprudential policy tools on financial stability.  A measure of market risk 
sentiment is included in an effort to add to the existing literature and to highlight our results in 
times of global pandemics or financial crises.   
 
 
38 Vice-President of the ECB between June 2010 and May 2018. 




We find that a tighter overall macroprudential policy stance would result in lower credit growth 
as well as lower GDP growth while, a tighter overall macroprudential policy tool stance would 
lead to higher inflation in the majority of cases.  Additionally, our results show that capital 
openness plays a more fundamental role in Latin American countries.  This makes intuitive 
sense as Latin American countries have a larger dependence on foreign capital flows and 
exchange rate movements.  Finally, higher levels of perceived market volatility results in an 
increased flow of assets from riskier markets, such as Latin America, to safer markets, such as 
the EU.  Our results show that, higher levels of the volatility index lead to lower inflation, lower 
credit growth and higher GDP growth in the EU panel.  Lower, steadier inflation is often 
associated with economic stability and growth.  In the other cases, higher levels of perceived 
volatility lead to higher inflation, higher credit growth and lower GDP growth.  The 
macroprudential stance of a country depends on both the geographic location and the specific 
policy tool implemented as factors such as capital openness and the influence of global market 
sentiment play an important role in the necessity to implement these tools as well as the success 
or failure of these tools. 
 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 surveys existing literature; Section 3 discusses the 
methodology and the data used; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
The widespread use of macroprudential policy tools emerged in the aftermath of the GFC when 
Central Bankers and policy makers realised that a policy framework with a focus on 
constraining systematic risk was needed.  Allen and Gale (2007), Schularick and Taylor (2012) 
and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) point out that systematic crises usually occur after periods 
of rapid and strong credit growth instead of being random, exogenously caused events.  Caruana 
(2010)39 states that the aim of macroprudential policy is “to reduce systemic risk by explicitly 
addressing the interconnections between financial institutions and their common exposures and 
the pro-cyclicality of the financial system”.  The reduction of the procyclicality of the financial 
system and systematic risk through the use of macroprudential policy tools is studied by Lim 
et al. (2011) using a dynamic panel data model covering 49 countries over the period between 
2000 and 2010. They find that reserve requirements are indeed effective in reducing the 
 
39 See Borio (2003). 




procyclical behaviour of credit growth.  Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2015)40 analyse the 
impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation on the real domestic credit growth rate 
while controlling for the level of the VIX index. They find that targeted macroprudential policy 
tools are able to mitigate fluctuations in real domestic credit growth in 57 emerging and 
advanced economies. 
 
The role of the housing market in the GFC has made it pertinent to study the impact of 
macroprudential policy implementation on both credit growth and housing prices.  Borio and 
Drehman (2009) and IMF (2014) note that rising home prices combined with increases in credit 
supply may signal a procyclical build-up of risks in the housing market.  Kuttner and Shim 
(2013)41 find that both the level of housing prices and the level of credit were effectively 
lowered after the implementation of macroprudential policy tools in 57 countries between 1980 
and 2011. Ahmed and Zlate (2013)42 focus on both the pre and post-crisis periods and by 
considering capital flows to emerging markets, they find that capital controls implemented in 
these countries were able to manage capital flows.   
 
Lopez and Bruni (2019) note that the macroprudential policy framework implemented needs to 
be “an adaptable and flexible global network” and they define both the objectives and levels of 
impact of each of the different policy frameworks implemented by Central Banks and policy 
makers (see Table 1).  Peydró (2016) points out that financial crises are often followed by credit 
crunches, the same is noted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)43 who note that long-lasting 
recessions with falling aggregate welfare and employment are often preceded by financial 
crises.  Gupta et al. (2009) find that countercyclical macroprudential policy tools are able to 
shorten the duration of crises.  Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) find that macroprudential policy tool 
implementation has both the ability to mitigate credit booms as well as the ability to reduce the 
likelihood of booms leading to financial catastrophes.   
 
 
40 Tovar et al. (2012) and Habermeier et al. (2011). 
41 See Vandenbussche et al. (2012), Ahuja and Nabar (2011), The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2011), Kim 
(2014), Zhang and Zoli (2014), Crowe et al. (2011) and Cerutti et al. (2015).   
42 Baba and Kokenyne (2011) find that capital controls that do not cover the majority of inflows may not have 
the macroeconomic impact that is expected even if they are successful at reducing targeted flows. 
43 See Peydró (2016). 




Table 10 - Objectives and Impact of Policy Frameworks 
 
Source: Lopez and Bruni (2019). 
 
Cerutti et al. (2017) make use of a manually coded index of the macroprudential instruments, 
based on an IMF survey and earlier studies, implemented in 119 countries between 2000 and 
2013. The authors find that a tighter macroprudential policy stance does indeed have a 
mitigating effect on developments in real credit growth.  Cerutti et al. (2017) also find that 
macroprudential policy tools are used more frequently in emerging economies and that the 
success of these policies is largely dependent on the instrument choice as well as the country in 
question.  Claessens (2017) notes that globalisation has resulted in a reduced ability to control 
domestic finance and the author shows that macroprudential policy tool implementation is less 
effective in developed markets.  
 
The Committee on Global Financial Systems (2010) states that macroprudential policy 
“complements the micro-prudential focus on the safety and soundness of individual 
institutions”.  Agénor et al. (2012) make use of a DSGE model to show that macroprudential 
policy in a small open economy may help with the policy tensions attached to shifts in capital 
flows.  Bruno et al. (2014) look at 12 Asia-Pacific countries and find that policies targeting the 
banking sector and bond market capital flows effectively manage bank inflows and bond 
inflows respectively. The authors also find that, in some cases, macroprudential policy 
implementation may be more successful when policies are implemented in such a way that they 
complement tighter monetary policy instead of competing policy frameworks being 
implemented.  Agur and Demertzis (2015) find that monetary policy still has the ability to affect 
financial stability in the presence of macroprudential policy tools. 
 
Our paper adds to the existing literature in a number of ways.  Firstly, although our country set 
is not as extensive as that used in Cerutti et al. (2017), Alam et al. (2019) or Belkhir et al. 




(2020), our paper includes a longer period with a higher number of observations, due to the use 
of quarterly data, than that used in Cerutti et al. (2017) by making use of the iMapp index of 
macroprudential policy choice changes created by Alam et al. (2019), extending this iMapp 
index through 2017Q4 and then cross checking this extended index with the Cerutti et al. (2017) 
index.  The index used in our paper therefore includes 17 policy choices in line with Alam et 
al. (2019).  This is more than the 12 included in the Cerutti et al. (2017) index.  Secondly, in 
the spirit of Belkhir et al. (2020) and Kim and Mehrotra (2017), we use three veins to study the 
impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation.  We first look at the ability of 
macroprudential policy to curb fluctuations in credit supply, we then look at the impact on the 
real economy by studying the effect on GDP and finally, we look at the impact on inflation.  By 
looking at these three factors individually, we hope to understand the ability of macroprudential 
policy to achieve financial stability in times of uncertainty.  By including a factor which 
captures the level of global risk aversion in our analysis, namely VIX, we hope to capture the 
level of uncertainty in international markets which may deem the study relevant in times such 
as those in the face of global pandemics or financial crises.  Finally, our paper includes a number 
of case studies which allows us to deviate from the existing literature as we focus on the 
implementation of policy tools in these countries.   
 
4.3. Methodology and Data 
4.3.1. Methodology 
An index of domestic macroprudential policy tools is constructed and the effectiveness of these 
tools in controlling credit growth is studied using a dynamic panel data model. A dummy 
variable with value +1 is assigned in the presence of a tightening of macroprudential policy, -1 
is assigned when macroprudential policy is loosened and 0 is assigned when there is no change 
to the macroprudential stance. A cumulative index of the macroprudential policy stance is also 
included. When two or three macroprudential policy tools are implemented or tightened, the 
cumulative index takes a corresponding value of +2 or +3.  In the case where a number of policy 
tools are loosened, the cumulative index takes a corresponding value of -2 or -3.  The impact 
of macroprudential policy implementation on credit growth is measured while controlling for 








The regression equations are as follows:  
 
Credit_Growthit = 𝜑𝑖  + β1Credit_Growthit-1 + β2iit-1 + β3VIXit-1 
+ β4Macroprudential_Indexit-1 + β5yit-1 + β6Capital_Openness it-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1) 
 
yit = 𝜑𝑖  + β1yit-1 + β2iit-1 + β3VIXit-1 
+ β4Macroprudential_Indexit-1 + β5Capital_Openness it-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (2) 
 
πit = 𝜑𝑖  + β1πit-1 + β2iit-1 + β3VIXit-1 
+ β4Macroprudential_Indexit-1 + β5yit-1 + β6Capital_Openness it-1 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡, (3) 
 
where, Credit_Growtht is the quarterly year-on-year growth in the level of credit, VIXt is the 
quarterly year-on-year growth in the level of the VIX index, it is the quarterly year-on-year 
growth in the interest rate, Macrorudential_Indexit is the value of the macroprudential policy 
index, yit is the quarterly year-on-year GDP growth rate, πit is the quarterly year-on-year 
growth in inflation, Capital_Opennesst is the level of the Chinn Ito capital openness index, 𝜑i 
are country fixed effects to account for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity and 𝜀it is a 
disturbance term satisfying standard conditions of zero mean and constant variance.  
 
Four panel unit root tests are run to test for the presence of panel unit roots in both the panels 
as well as the individual country cases (three unit root tests for the country cases). Firstly, three 
first-generation panel unit root tests (Maddala and Wu test, the Fisher-Type Phillips-Perron test 
and the Fisher-Type Augmented Dickey-Fuller test) are included which assume that cross 
sectional units are independent while the second-generation panel unit root test (Pesaran test) 
allows for cross sectional dependence.  The first-generation Maddala and Wu test (Table L1 in 
Appendix L) tests for the presence of panel unit roots, and we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of panel unit roots when considering the lagged capital openness for the EU panel, Portugal and 
the UK as well as lagged credit growth for the Portuguese case.  The null hypothesis of all 
panels containing unit roots is rejected for the Latin American panel, the remaining variables 
in the EU panel and the full sample. The first-generation Fisher-Type test (Phillips-Perron test, 
Table L2 in Appendix L) tests for the presence of a unit root and shows that we reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for all variables in the Latin American panel, the EU panel (except the 
capital openness in this case) and the full sample. We also reject the null hypothesis of a unit 




root for the majority of variables in the three country cases with the exception of the interest 
rate in all three country cases, both GDP growth and growth in inflation in the Portuguese case 
and capital openness in the cases of the United Kingdom and Portugal.  The first-generation 
Fisher-Type unit root tests therefore show that the lagged first-differenced variables have an 
order of integration of I(0) implying that, the lagged first differenced variables are stationary 
for the majority of cases with the exception of the lagged first differenced interest rate for all 
three country cases, the GDP growth and inflation growth for the case of Portugal and capital 
openness for the cases of Portugal and the UK. Although, the Phillips-Perron test for the 
presence of a unit root indicates that seven of the series contain a unit root, when considering 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, this result changes. The results of the ADF test indicate that 
the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in all but three cases (the interest rate for the 
Portuguese case and the capital openness for both the UK and Portugal) and hence, only three 
of the series contain a unit root. The Phillips-Perron test corrects for the presence of serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors and it is shown that the first and second 
regressions in the case of Japan, the second and third regressions in the case of Portugal and the 
second regression in the case of the UK, in this case, the use of the unit root test that specifically 
corrects for serial correlation is the most appropriate.   
 
One should proceed with caution when analysing the results of unit root tests with small, finite 
samples as the results of both the Phillips-Perron unit root test as well as the results of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test may be severely size distorted.  These unit root tests may not 
have the ability to distinguish between persistent stationary processes and nonstationary 
processes although, our test regressions exclude trends and instead, only include a constant term 
which may improve the reliability of the above tests.   
 
The second-generation Pesaran test (Table L3 in Appendix L) tests for the presence of panel 
unit roots allowing for cross sectional dependence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of all 
panels containing unit roots when considering both the lagged growth in VIX for the Latin 
American panel, the EU panel and the full sample as well as the capital openness for the EU 
panel and the full sample. 
 
The problem of endogeneity may also present itself in the analysis as one may assume that the 
macroprudential policy stance of Central Banks and hence, the macroprudential policy tool 




index studied in this paper may be subject to some cross-correlation between the index and the 
error term or a reverse causality.  A reverse causality is evident in many empirical analyses 
dealing with financial development, output growth and financial stability with an example 
being the relationship between banking sector development and output growth as discussed by 
Peia and Roszbach (2015), a reverse causality between inequality and financial development is 
also discussed by Bazillier and Hericourt (2017).   
 
Therefore, in this paper, a reverse causality may exist between the macroprudential policy tool 
index and level of credit growth, GDP growth and growth in inflation. It is highly likely that 
the level of credit growth would influence the macroprudential policy stance of policy makers 
and Central Banks as the macroprudential policy stance is directly related to the policy makers’ 
view of the financial stability (as proxied by credit growth, GDP growth and growth in inflation 
in this paper) of the system at any given point in time.  The macroprudential policy tool index 
is indeed cointegrated with our three proxies for financial stability and a post-regression 
estimation test indicates that granger causality does indeed exist between variables.  In Nier et 
al. (2012), it is proposed that lagged variables should be included in the empirical analysis in 
an effort to mitigate the endogeneity problem and the lagged regression results should then be 
compared with those of the unlagged variables in an effort to identify any issues caused by the 
relationship between the potentially affected variable and the error term.  Further work could 
be conducted in an effort to identify a measure of financial stability that does not exhibit a 
reverse causality with the macroprudential policy tool index.  However, the chance of 
identifying such a variable is slim. 
 
Endogeneity may lead to biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates and the issue of 
endogeneity usually presents itself because of a reverse causality between the dependent and 
independent variables.  Endogeneity is also more likely to be an issue when considering macro 
analyses (in comparison to micro analyses) as it is more difficult to isolate the individual effects 
of the observable variables.  To account for endogeneity in the model, one would need to 
include an IV estimator that is correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with 
the error term.  It is unlikely that one would find a variable that meets these requirements when 
focusing on the macroprudential policy tool index. Hence, the macroprudential policy tool 
index is lagged by one period which should mitigate the effect of endogeneity as discussed in 
Nier et al. (2012).  To err on the side of caution and in line with Nier et al. (2012), the estimated 




coefficients are interpreted based on significance and sign instead of the value thereof.  Bruno 
and Shin (2013) lag all quarterly variables in the analysis by one quarter in an effort to mitigate 
endogeneity issues that may present themselves in this paper, all variables are also lagged by 
one quarter.  The lagging of all of the explanatory variables should mitigate any other 
endogeneity issues that may arise in the analysis. 
 
To add to the robustness of this paper, an additional regression is run (Table M1 in Appendix 
M) that includes an IV estimator.  Regulatory quality, which “reflects perceptions of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development” (Kaufmann et al., 2010), is included as an IV estimator to account 
for any endogeneity in the model caused by the potentially endogenous variable, the 
macroprudential policy tool index.  Regulatory quality is chosen as an appropriate IV estimator 
due to the likely correlation with the macroprudential policy tool index as the quality of 
regulation undoubtedly has an influence on the level of macroprudential policy intervention.  
Regulatory quality is unlikely to directly impact credit growth, GDP growth or inflation growth 
and instead, impacts these variables through the macroprudential policy tool index while being 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation (Table L4 in Appendix L) in panel data shows that the 
Latin American panel, the EU panel and the full sample do indeed suffer from serial correlation, 
the Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity (Table L5 in Appendix L) shows that both panels 
as well as the full sample also suffer from the presence of heteroskedasticity, the main results 
(Table 12 to Table 16) therefore include regression results with corrections for both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  The sum of macroprudential policy choices is the 
relevant variable for the statistical tests.  The results also hold for capital conservation buffers, 
countercyclical capital buffers, loan-to-value ratios and reserve requirements.   
 
The Modified Wald test for heteroskedasticity shows that heteroskedasticity is not an issue in 
the individual country cases, the Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation shows (Table L4 in 
Appendix L) that there is no first-order autocorrelation for the first regression in the case of 
Japan, the third regression in the case of Portugal and the first and third regressions in the case 
of the UK.  For the first and second regressions for the case of Japan, the test statistic lies within 
the bounds and hence, the results of the Durbin-Watson test are inconclusive, this is also true 




in the case of Portugal when considering the second and third regressions.  The correction for 
serial correlation is therefore included for the main results (Tables 12 to 16) for the first and 
second regressions for Japan, the second and third regressions for Portugal and the second 
regression for the UK.  The remaining results for the country cases only include country fixed 
effects.   
 
4.3.2. Data 
Allen and Gale (2007), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) and 
Borio (2018) note that credit growth is often a precursor of financial crises.  Credit growth is 
thus included as a proxy for financial stability.  A monthly index, iMaPP database constructed 
by Alam et al. (2019), of macroprudential policy tools implemented in the relevant countries is 
used as a starting point.  This index is coded through 2016:Q4, this index is then cross checked 
using the Cerutti et al. (2017) index and extended using the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey.  
The extension through 2017:Q4 is cross checked using the IMF Macroprudential Data Query 
Report.  The 2017 IMF survey is used as the deciding source and hence, when policy choices 
are reflected in the Data Query Report but not in the 2017 IMF Survey, these policy choices are 
not included.  The monthly iMaPP index is cumulated to create the quarterly database used in 
this paper.  The impact of macroprudential policy tool implementation on credit growth is 
studied for the period 2000:Q1 to 2017:Q4. The relevant countries are identified in Table 11. 
 
The relevant variables are as follows: 
• Credit growth as a proxy for financial depth (BIS total credit statistics and IMF); 
• The growth in the level of the VIX index is included as a proxy for the level of global 
risk aversion (Federal Reserve Economic Data); 
• The GDP growth is included as a proxy for the business cycle (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data and OECD Stats); 
• The interest rate growth is included as a proxy for the cost of borrowing (World 
Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank of 
Argentina); 
• The growth in the rate of inflation is included as a proxy for instability in the economy 
(it serves both as a broad measure of the standard of living within an economy as well 
as the willingness to consume); 




• The level of the Chinn Ito Capital Openness Index is included as a proxy for the level 
of cross-border capital flows; 
Table 11 - Countries Included in the Analysis 
Countries       
EU Panel Latin American Panel Full Sample Country Cases 
Austria Argentina Austria Japan 
Belgium Brazil Belgium Portugal 
Bulgaria Chile Bulgaria The UK 
Croatia Colombia Croatia   
CzechRepublic Mexico CzechRepublic   
Denmark Peru Denmark   
Estonia Uruguay Estonia   
Finland   Finland   
France   France   
Germany   Germany   
Greece   Greece   
Hungary   Hungary   
Ireland   Ireland   
Italy   Italy   
Latvia   Latvia   
Lithuania   Lithuania   
Luxembourg   Luxembourg   
Malta   Malta   
Netherlands   Netherlands   
Poland   Poland   
Portugal   Portugal   
Romania   Romania   
SlovakRepublic   SlovakRepublic   
Slovenia   Slovenia   
Spain   Spain   
Sweden   Sweden   
The UK   The UK   
    Argentina   
    Brazil   
    Chile   
    Colombia   
    Mexico   
    Peru   
    Uruguay   
    Japan   
 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in 27 
European countries between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4 while Figure 5 shows the cumulative index 
of macroprudential policy tools implemented in 7 Latin American countries between 2000:Q1 
and 2017:Q4.  The graphs below show that the number of instances where macroprudential 
policy tools were implemented or the stance was tightened increased between 2000:Q1 and 
2017:Q4 in the European panel, in the case of the Latin American panel, it is evident that the 
number of instances where macroprudential policy tools were either implemented or tightened 
increased in the time around the GFC.  The macroprudential stance of Latin American countries 
became more active in the time around the GFC. 
 




Figure 4 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in 27 
European Countries 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 5 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in 7 Latin 
American Countries 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in Japan 
between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4.  Figure 7 shows the cumulative index of macroprudential 
policy tools implemented in Portugal between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4 while Figure 8 shows the 
cumulative index of macroprudential policy tools implemented in the UK between 2000:Q1 
and 2017:Q4.  The macroprudential policy stance in Japan has become more active in recent 
years and the same applies to Portugal.  Lastly, Figure 8 shows that the macroprudential policy 
stance became more active in the case of the UK in the period after the GFC while, the policy 
stance has once again been active since 2016.  
 




Figure 6 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Japan 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 7 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in Portugal 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 
Figure 8 - Cumulative Index of Macroprudential Policy Tools Implemented in The 
United Kingdom 
 
Source: Author’s Index based on Alam et al. (2019), Cerutti et al. (2017) and IMF (2018, 2019). 
 





4.4.1. Regression Results: Capital Conservation Buffer 
Table 12 focuses on the capital conservation buffer and the value of the macroprudential policy 
choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  When considering the first regression, the 
coefficient on the lagged credit growth is positive in all cases, this result is statistically 
significant when considering the Latin American panel as well as the three country cases.  
Capital openness is statistically significant in the Latin American panel and the negative sign 
on the coefficient indicates that a higher degree of capital openness in Latin America may result 
in lower levels of domestic credit.  The negative adjusted R2 in the case of the EU panel and the 
full sample indicates that the model may not be useful in explaining movements in credit 
growth.  For the second regression, we once again find that capital openness is statistically 
significant in the Latin American panel.  The positive sign on the coefficient indicates that GDP 
growth increases as capital openness increases.  The lagged level of GDP growth is statistically 
significant and positive in all cases except Portugal where convergence was not possible in the 
regression.  In the final regression, the lagged inflation growth is positive and statistically 
significant in all cases.  The lagged level of the macroprudential policy tool index is negative 
in all cases except the UK and is statistically significant in both the EU panel as well as the full 
sample.  The capital conservation buffer may therefore play an important role in the 
macroprudential policy tool stance of European countries, the negative relationship indicates 
that a higher capital conservation buffer may lead to decreased inflation. 
 




Table 12 - Regression Results for Capital Conservation Buffer 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
 
4.4.2. Regression Results: Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
Table 13 focuses on the countercyclical capital buffer and the value of the macroprudential 
policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The results are similar to those in Table 12 
where, in the first regression, the coefficient of the lagged value of credit growth is positive in 
all cases and statistically significant in the Latin American panel as well as the three country 
cases.  Capital openness has a negative and statistically significant relationship with credit 
growth in the Latin American panel whereas, in the second regression, we once again see a 




positive relationship between GDP growth and the level of capital openness.  We see a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on lagged GDP growth for all cases in the second 
regression and a positive and statistically significant coefficient on lagged inflation growth in 
the third regression. 
Table 13 - Regression Results for Countercyclical Capital Buffer 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
 
4.4.3. Regression Results: Limits on Loan-to-Value Ratios 
Table 14 focuses on limits on loan-to-value ratios and the value of the macroprudential policy 
choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The coefficient on the lagged value of credit 




growth is once again both positive and statistically significant for the Latin American panel as 
well as the three country cases in the first regression.  Capital openness once again has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with credit growth in the Latin American 
panel.  In the second regression, the coefficient on lagged GDP growth is once again positive 
and statistically significant in all cases, the macroprudential policy tool index once again has a 
negative and statistically significant relationship with GDP growth in the Latin American panel 
and finally, capital openness has a positive and statistically significant relationship with GDP 
growth in the Latin American panel.  This implies that increases in the LTV ratio and lower 
levels of capital openness may result in lower GDP growth.  In the third regression, lagged 
inflation growth has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all cases except the 
UK.   




Table 14 - Regression Results for Limits on Loan-to-Value Ratios 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 
 
4.4.4. Regression Results: Reserve Requirements 
Table 15 focuses on reserve requirements and the value of the macroprudential policy choice 
index is therefore indicative thereof.  The results are once again in line with those in Table 12, 
13 and 14 with the exception of the lagged credit growth in the first regression no longer being 
statistically significant in the EU panel and the full sample.  Nonetheless, the sign remains 
positive.  Additionally, the macroprudential index in both the first and second regressions 
becomes statistically significant in the case of Portugal and the macroprudential index in the 
third regression becomes statistically significant in both the EU panel as well as the full sample.  




This result implies that higher reserve requirements may result in higher inflation in the full 
sample as well as in Europe.  At the same time, higher reserve requirements may result in lower 
credit growth and higher GDP growth in Portugal. 
 
Table 15 - Regression Results for Reserve Requirements 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   










4.4.5. Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices 
Table 16 focuses on the sum of macroprudential policy choices and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  The results are in line with 
those of the regressions using the individual policy choices.  Lagged credit growth in the first 
regression, lagged GDP growth in the second and lagged inflation growth in the third all have 
positive and statistically significant coefficients.  One notable result in all the regression 
equations is the negative sign on lagged inflation in the UK in the third regression as this stays 
consistent throughout.  This result is opposite to the other cases. 
 
Table 16 - Regression Results for Sum of Macroprudential Policy Changes 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
* Represents statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.  (0, .)  indicates results omitted due to 
cointegration. 




Although lagged inflation growth carries a positive sign in most of the cases, in the case of the 
UK this variable carries a negative and not statistically significant coefficient.  The robustness 
checks conducted all focus on the sum of macroprudential policy tools with the first robustness 
check focusing on a case with an instrumental variable namely, Regulatory Quality (Appendix 
M1).  The results are in line with the main results (Tables 12 to 16), one noticeable change is 
the change in the sign of the coefficient of lagged GDP growth in the second regression where 
the full sample now has a negative and statistically significant coefficient.  The results of 
additional robustness checks44 are similar to those of the main results discussed, noticeably, the 
coefficient on the lagged credit growth in the first regression remains positive in all cases and 
is statistically significant in the majority of cases.  The sign on the coefficient of both lagged 
GDP growth and inflation growth, in the second and third regressions respectively, remains 
positive and statistically significant in the majority of cases with a few notable exceptions being 
that of the case of the EU panel when looking at a second robustness check which includes a 
post-crisis dummy.  In this case, lagged inflation growth in the EU carries a negative and 
statistically significant sign.   
 
When considering the statistical significance of the coefficients of the macroprudential policy 
tools we find that the capital conservation buffer carries a negative sign in many of the cases 
(first and third regressions) with the index having a negative and statistically significant sign in 
the case of the EU panel and the full sample for the third regression.  The countercyclical capital 
buffer carries a negative and statistical sign in the first and third regressions while, in the second, 
the sign is positive and statistically significant.  For loan to value ratios, this result seems to 
reverse with the first and third regressions carrying a positive sign on the index and the second 
regression having a negative sign on the index.  For reserve requirements, the first and second 
regressions carry negative signs on the index with the exception of the case of Portugal where 
the sign is positive and statistically significant for the second regression.  In the third regression, 
the index carries a positive and statistically significant sign.  Finally, the summed index carries 
a negative sign in the first and second regressions while, in the third regression, the index carries 
a positive sign.  These results are in line with those of the robustness checks where the sign of 
the coefficient is negative in the majority of cases when considering the first and second 
regressions while, the sign is positive when considering the third regression.   
 
44 Regression results of robustness checks available on request. 




When considering the two factors that account for the influence of foreign markets namely, the 
lagged level of the volatility index and the lagged level of the capital openness index, we find 
that the level of capital openness carries a negative sign in the first and third regressions in the 
majority of cases.  The level of capital openness carries a positive sign in the majority of cases 
when considering the second regression.  Further, we find that the results are mainly statistically 
significant in the case of the Latin American panel.  The statistical significance in the Latin 
American panel makes sense intuitively as Latin American countries have a greater dependence 
on foreign capital flows and exchange rate movements.  The lagged level of the volatility index 
carries a negative sign in the majority of cases when considering the second regression equation 
while, this coefficient is positive in the majority of cases for first and third regressions.  In the 
case of the EU panel, this result reverses in a number of cases where, the sign is positive in the 
second regression and negative in the first and third regressions.  Where a higher level of capital 
openness results in higher GDP growth in the majority of cases, higher levels of capital 
openness are associated with lower growth in inflation and credit especially, in the case of Latin 
America.  Higher levels of the volatility index45 result in both higher credit growth as well as 
higher growth in inflation while, lower levels of the volatility index result in lower GDP growth.  
In times of higher market volatility, investors are prone to moving assets to safer markets which 
is in line with the results for the European panel where, higher volatility results in higher GDP 
growth and lower inflation as investors move their assets away from riskier markets such as 
Latin America.   
 
When looking at the main results, we see that the adjusted R2 is negative in a number of cases 
for the EU panel (first regression), the full panel (first regression) and the UK (third regression).  
A negative adjusted R2 occurs when the model does not effectively explain movements in the 
dependent variable.  When looking at a robustness check focusing on the period post crisis, we 
find that the adjusted R2 becomes positive in each of these cases.  European countries, including 
the UK, did not make use of macroprudential policy tools prior to the GFC and the level of 
capital openness does not play as significant a role in these cases as it does in the case of Latin 
American countries, this may explain the negative adjusted R2 in these cases.  
 
45Higher perceived volatility in the markets which hence, results in investors becoming more risk averse. 





In the aftermath of the GFC, policy makers around the world came to the realization that 
traditional prudential policy frameworks with monetary policy as a prioritized policy tool 
lacked the scope to prevent financial crises and the financial turmoil that often accompanies 
these.  The US housing bubble had severe effects on both the US economy as well as the global 
economy and although, the Federal Reserve and other Central Banks were unable to contain 
the turmoil, macroprudential policy frameworks emerged with the aim of achieving both 
financial and economic security and stability going forward as well as ensuring that bubbles 
never again grow to the disproportionately dangerous levels experienced prior to the GFC. 
 
This paper studies the impact of macroprudential policy during uncertain times through three 
veins of financial stability for both an EU panel as well as a Latin American panel.  A case 
study looking at the cases of Japan, Portugal and the UK is also included.  A monthly index, 
iMaPP database constructed by Alam et al. (2019), of macroprudential policy tools 
implemented in the relevant countries is used as a starting point. This index is coded through 
2016:Q4, this index is then cross checked using the Cerutti et al. (2017) index and extended 
using the 2017 IMF Macroprudential Survey and the IMF Macroprudential Data Query report. 
The monthly index is cumulated to create the quarterly database used in this paper.  The 
extended and updated index is then used to study the effectiveness of macroprudential policy 
tools in taming credit growth, stabilising GDP growth and controlling inflation growth using a 
dynamic panel data model for the period between 2000:Q1 and 2017:Q4.  Using this index, we 
look at the ability of macroprudential policy to curb fluctuations in credit supply, the impact of 
macroprudential policy on the real economy by studying the effect on GDP and finally, the 
impact on inflation.  Further, we include a measure of market volatility in an effort to 
supplement existing literature and with the hope of bringing our results to the forefront in the 
face of global pandemics or financial crises.  By looking at these three factors individually, we 
hope to understand the ability of macroprudential policy to achieve financial stability in times 
of uncertainty.   
 
Our main results find that the coefficient of the summed macroprudential policy tool index 
carries a negative sign in the majority of cases when considering the first two regressions while, 
the summed index carries a positive sign in the majority of cases when considering the third 
regression.  One could conclude that a tighter overall macroprudential policy stance would 




result in lower credit growth as well as lower GDP growth while, a tighter overall 
macroprudential policy tool stance would lead to higher inflation in the majority of cases.  Two 
noticeable exceptions are firstly, the case of Portugal when considering reserve requirements 
where, the coefficient of the policy tool in the second regression is positive and statistically 
significant.  Secondly, the EU panel when considering the countercyclical capital buffer where, 
the coefficient of the policy tool in the second regression is positive and statistically significant.  
Our results further show that capital openness plays a bigger role in the case of Latin America 
which makes intuitive sense as Latin American countries have a larger dependence on foreign 
capital flows.  Finally, higher levels of perceived market volatility result in an increased flow 
of assets into safer markets such as the EU.  This is confirmed by our results where higher 
perceived volatility results in higher GDP growth and lower inflation in the EU panel whereas, 
in the other cases, higher levels of perceived volatility lead to higher inflation, higher credit 
growth and lower GDP growth.  The macroprudential stance of a country depends on both the 
geographic location and the specific policy tool implemented as factors such as capital openness 
and the influence of global market sentiment play an important role in the success or failure of 
these tools. 
  




4.6. Appendix K 
K.1. Variable Sources 
Table K1 - Sources of Variables  
       
Data Sources             
Variable Countries Code Source Frequency 
Initial 
Date End Date 





Bulgaria,  FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS 
International Monetary Fund. 
International Financial Statistics 
estimates. Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
            
            
              
CreditGrowthYOY     
Author's own calculations using 
Credit Quarterly 01/01/2000 31/12/2017 
PolicyRate     International Financial Statistics (IFS) Quarterly     
PolicyRate Argentina BCRA_LEBAC Central Bank of Argentina Weekly 16/10/2002 19/09/2018 
PolicyRate Croatia FR.INR.RINR World Development Indicators Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2014 
             
PolicyRate Romania FR.INR.RINR World Development Indicators Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
              
PolicyRateGrowthYOY     
Author's own calculations using 
Policy_Rate Quarterly     
VIXYOY   VIXCLS_PC1 Federal Reserve Economic Data Quarterly 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
GDP Peru MKTGDPPEA646NWDB Federal Reserve Economic Data Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
GDP Uruguay RGDPNAUYA666NRUG Federal Reserve Economic Data Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
GDP Malta MKTGDPMTA646NWDB Federal Reserve Economic Data Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 





Croatia   Author's own calculations using GDP Quarterly 01/01/2000 31/12/2017 
GDPYOY   GYSA OECD Stat  Quarterly 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
InflationYOY   PCPI_PC_CP_A_PT IMF Quarterly 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
CapitalOpenness     
Chinn, Menzie D. and Hiro Ito 
(2008). "A New Measure of Financial 
Openness". Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis, Volume 10, Issue 3, 
p. 309 – 322 (September). Annual 01/01/1999 31/12/2017 
 
K.2. Variable Definitions 
Table K2 - Definitions of Variables 
    
Variable  Description 







Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations.      
such as through loans. purchases of nonequity securities. and trade credits and other accounts receivable. that establish a claim for 
repayment.  
For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities 
and deposit money banks. as well as other financial corporations where data are available (including corporations that do not 
accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations 
are finance and leasing companies. money lenders. insurance corporations. pension funds. and foreign exchange companies. 
CreditGrowthYOY Growth Rate in Credit.  Change from previous year. 
PolicyRate Financial, Interest Rates, Monetary Policy-Related Interest Rate, Percent per annum 
PolicyRate 30-day LEBAC Interest Rates, % a.n. 
PolicyRate 
  
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions  
attached to lending rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability. 
PolicyRate 
  
Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. The terms and conditions  
attached to lending rates differ by country, however, limiting their comparability. 
PolicyRateGrowthYO
Y 
Growth Rate in the Policy Rate  Change from previous year.  
VIX_YOY CBOE Volatility Index: VIX, Percent Change from Year Ago, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDP Gross Domestic Product for Peru, Current U,S, Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDP Real GDP at Constant National Prices for Uruguay, Millions of 2011 U,S, Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDP Gross Domestic Product for Malta, Current U,S, Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDP Gross Domestic Product for Croatia, Current U,S, Dollars, Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted 
GDPYOY Growth Rate in GDP.  Change from previous year. 
GDPYOY B1_GE: Gross domestic product - expenditure approach, Growth rate compared to the same quarter of previous year, seasonally 
adjusted 
InflationYOY Consumer Price Index, All items, Percentage change, Previous year 
CapitalOpenness The Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) is an index measuring a country's degree of capital account openness. 




K.3. Summary Statistics 
Table K3 - Summary Statistics for Japan, Portugal and the UK 
Summary Statistics: Country Cases           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Japan           
credit_growth 72 0.010994 0.022135 -0.02242 0.089557 
policyrate_growth 59 0.184037 1.045202 -0.66864 4.48511 
vix_growth 72 1.816374 38.58624 -60.6284 165.984 
gdp_growth 72 0.94471 2.222137 -8.67535 5.51386 
sum_17 72 0.111111 0.358226 0 2 
inflation_growth 72 0.03757 1.032074 -2.21328 3.601108 
capital_openness 72 2.333585 0 2.333585 2.333585 
Portugal           
credit_growth 72 0.032992 0.043781 -0.05832 0.130215 
policyrate_growth 62 -0.14144 0.472961 -1 0.8 
vix_growth 72 1.816374 38.58624 -60.6284 165.984 
gdp_growth 72 0.7079 2.261377 -4.52805 4.3626 
sum_17 72 0.013889 0.265004 -1 1 
inflation_growth 72 2.016892 1.504777 -1.51295 4.793112 
capital_openness 72 2.333585 0 2.333585 2.333585 
The UK           
credit_growth 71 0.027788 0.031222 -0.0415 0.098347 
policyrate_growth 71 -0.11577 0.329923 -1 0.357143 
vix_growth 72 1.816374 38.58624 -60.6284 165.984 
gdp_growth 72 1.901558 1.930302 -5.80664 4.80586 
sum_17 72 0.166667 0.530745 -1 3 
inflation_growth 72 0.504428 0.453511 -0.53351 1.853312 
capital_openness 72 2.333585 0 2.333585 2.333585 
 
Table K4 - Summary Statistics for the European Panel, the Latin American Panel and 
the Full Sample 
Summary Statistics: Panels           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
EU Panel           
credit_growth 1,914 0.191729 6.450008 -1.799857 279.2292 
policyrate_growth 1,743 -0.1334895 0.6516293 -15.30976 4 
vix_growth 1,944 1.815278 38.32681 -60.6 166 
gdp_growth 1,944 3.250558 2.842606 -0.1414702 29.17192 
sum_17 1,944 0.1188272 0.6194443 -3 5 
inflation_growth 1,892 2.555441 3.011824 -6.12777 40.07618 
capital_openness 1,944 1.93786 0.8413734 -1.21854 2.333585 
Latin American Panel           
credit_growth 504 0.020933 0.1698064 -0.439793 1.71199 
policyrate_growth 377 0.0735466 0.6787663 -1 6.44 
vix_growth 504 1.815278 38.35502 -60.6 166 
gdp_growth 480 3.352823 4.828627 -15.2197 22.1026 
sum_17 504 0.1468254 0.8566602 -4 4 
inflation_growth 364 5.188172 2.502352 -3.029207 16.85826 
capital_openness 504 0.802214 1.333033 -1.920278 2.333585 
Full Sample           
credit_growth 2,490 0.1519322 5.655626 -1.799857 279.2292 
policyrate_growth 2,179 -0.0890715 0.675592 -15.30976 6.44 
vix_growth 2,520 1.815309 38.32456 -60.6284 166 
gdp_growth 2,496 3.203709 3.32606 -15.2197 29.17192 
sum_17 2,520 0.1242063 0.6680253 -4 5 
inflation_growth 2,328 2.889216 3.090259 -6.12777 40.07618 




4.7. Appendix L 
L.1. Maddala and Wu Test (Maddala and Wu, 1999) for the Presence of Panel Unit 
Roots 
Table L1 - Maddala and Wu Unit Root Tests 
H0: Presence of a Unit Root 
     
  
  Observations Statistic P-Value   Observations Statistic P-Value 
Latin Panel       The UK       
Credit_Growthit-1 504 59.05 0.0000 Credit_Growthit-1 71 6.913 0.032 
iit-1 377 85.119 0.0000 iit-1 71 5.815 0.055 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 504 181.012 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 38.92 0.0000 
yit-1 480 64.091 0.0000 yit-1 72 19.397 0.0000 
vixt-1 504 65.053 0.0000 vixt-1 72 9.289 0.01 
inflationt-1 364 80.884 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 17.291 0.0000 
capital_opennesst-1 504 45.982 0.0000 capital_opennesst-1 72 0.0000 0.0000 
EU Panel       Japan       
Credit_Growthit-1 1914 223.166 0.0000 Credit_Growthit-1 72 13.223 0.001 
iit-1 1743 210.896 0.0000 iit-1 59 8.637 0.013 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 1944 746.022 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 17.796 0.0000 
yit-1 1944 322.162 0.0000 yit-1 72 17.197 0.0000 
vixt-1 1944 250.92 0.0000 vixt-1 72 9.289 0.01 
inflationt-1 1892 210.417 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 7.009 0.03 
capital_opennesst-1 1944 46.974 0.74 capital_opennesst-1 72 29.511 0.0000 
Full Sample       Portugal       
Credit_Growthit-1 2490 295.438 0.0000 Credit_Growthit-1 72 3.36 0.186 
iit-1 2179 304.651 0.0000 iit-1 62 7.498 0.024 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 2520 944.83 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 49.631 0.0000 
yit-1 2496 403.45 0.0000 yit-1 72 5.284 0.071 
vixt-1 2520 325.263 0.0000 vixt-1 72 9.289 0.01 
inflationt-1 2328 298.309 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 4.978 0.083 
capital_opennesst-1 2520 122.468 0.0000 capital_opennesst-1 72 0.0000 1 
Note: First generation Maddala and Wu Test for panel unit roots (Maddala and Wu, 1999) results based on: Ho: 
All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared test 
are presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of 
a unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations 





L.2. First Generation Fisher Type Tests (Phillips–Perron Test) for the Presence of Panel 
Unit Roots 
Table L2 - Results of Fisher Type Unit Root Tests 
Fisher Type Tests (Phillips–Perron Test) for the Presence of a Unit Root       
H0: Presence of a Unit Root 
     
  
  Observations Statistic P-Value   Observations Statistic P-Value 
Latin Panel       The UK       
Credit_Growthit-1 504 36.3021 0.0009 Credit_Growthit-1 71 5.0454 0.0802 
iit-1 377 26.1996 0.0244 iit-1 71 1.5772 0.4545 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 504 337.0854 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 43.9736 0.0000 
yit-1 480 26.9912 0.0193 yit-1 72 4.6501 0.0978 
vixt-1 504 100.2856 0.0000 vixt-1 72 14.3197 0.0008 
inflationt-1 364 66.9196 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 72.0873 0.0000 
capital_opennesst-1 504 35.595 0.0012 capital_opennesst-1 72 0.0000 1 
EU Panel       Japan       
Credit_Growthit-1 1914 232.9835 0.0000 Credit_Growthit-1 72 5.2564 0.0722 
iit-1 1743 145.7935 0.0000 iit-1 59 3.6549 0.1608 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 1944 1432.4526 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 37.0954 0.0000 
yit-1 1944 235.4274 0.0000 yit-1 72 9.1435 0.0103 
vixt-1 1944 386.816 0.0000 vixt-1 72 14.3197 0.0008 
inflationt-1 1892 136.7716 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 5.3363 0.0694 
capital_opennesst-1 1944 41.0301 0.9785 capital_opennesst-1 72 20.0388 0.0000 
Full Sample       Portugal       
Credit_Growthit-1 2490 274.5419 0.0000 Credit_Growthit-1 72 2.4659 0.02914 
iit-1 2179 175.648 0.0000 iit-1 62 2.9358 0.2304 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 2520 1806.6334 0.0000 Macrorudential_Indexit-1 72 70.0601 0.0000 
yit-1 2496 271.5622 0.0000 yit-1 72 4.2489 0.1195 
vixt-1 2520 501.4213 0.0000 vixt-1 72 14.3197 0.0008 
inflationt-1 2328 209.0274 0.0000 inflationt-1 72 2.667 0.2635 
capital_opennesst-1 2520 96.6638 0.0191 capital_opennesst-1 72 0.0000 1 
Note: First generation Fisher Type test for panel unit roots (Phillips–Perron test) results based on: Ho: All panels 
contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared test are 
presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of a 
unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations 





L.3. Second Generation Pesaran Test (Pesaran, 2007) for the Presence of Panel Unit 
Roots 
Table L3 - Pesaran Unit Root Tests 
Pesaran Test (Pesaran, 2007) for the Presence of a Unit Root 
H0: Presence of a Unit Root 
  
  Observations Statistic P-Value 
Latin Panel       
Credit_Growthit-1 504 -2.627 0.004 
iit-1 377 -2.790 0.003 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 504 -8.649 0.0000 
yit-1 480 -3.568 0.0000 
vixt-1 504 12.764 1 
inflationt-1 364 -5.257 0.0000 
capital_opennesst-1 504 -0.471 0.0000 
EU Panel       
Credit_Growthit-1 1914 -3.470 0.0000 
iit-1 1743 -13.182 0.0000 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 1944 -19.806 0.0000 
yit-1 1944 -9.944 0.0000 
vixt-1 1944 24.851 1 
inflationt-1 1892 -6.968 0.0000 
capital_opennesst-1 1944 11.029 1 
Full Sample       
Credit_Growthit-1 2490 -8.088 0.0000 
iit-1 2179 -11.973 0.0000 
Macrorudential_Indexit-1 2520 -21.778 0.0000 
yit-1 2496 -13.246 0.0000 
vixt-1 2520 26.677 1 
inflationt-1 2328 -8.174 0.0000 
capital_opennesst-1 2520 9.482 1 
Note: Second generation Pesaran test for panel unit roots (Pesaran, 2007) results based on: Ho: All panels 
contain unit roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary. The results of an Inverse Chi-squared test are 
presented in the above table with both the Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The presence of a 
unit root is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations 





L.4. Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin Watson Test for 
Autocorrelation: 
Table L4 - Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data and Durbin 
Watson Test for Autocorrelation 
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data           
H0: No First-Order Autocorrelation           
  Observations Statistic P-Value   Observations Statistic P-Value 
Latin Panel       EU Panel       
I 347 88.763 0.0001 I 1695 74121.895 0.0000 
II 347 19.746 0.0044 II 1723 44.115 0.0000 
III 272 30.981 0.0026 III 1674 294.81 0.0000 
Full Sample           
I 2100 68755.738 0.0000     
II 2128 32.018 0.0000     
III 2004 341.184 0.0000     
Durbin Watson Test for Autocorrelation        
H0: No First-Order Autocorrelation        
  Observations Statistic dL Du    
The UK            
I 70 1.652052 1.283 1.645    
II 71 0.998289 1.313 1.611    
III 71 1.849911 1.283 1.645    
Japan            
I 58 1.486066 1.214 1.639    
II 58 1.353391 1.248 1.598    
III 58 1.76191 1.214 1.639    
Portugal            
I 62 1.736066 1.214 1.639    
II 62 1.567498 1.248 1.598    
III 62 1.499759 1.214 1.639    
Note: Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No First-Order Autocorrelation and Ha: First 
Order Autocorrelation. The results of the F-test and the corresponding p-values are presented in the above table. 
The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected for the cases where the p-value < 0.1. Durbin 
Watson test for Autocorrelation results based on: Ho: No Autocorrelation and Ha: Positive Autocorrelation or 
Inconclusive Results. The Durbin Watson Test Statistic is quoted in the table above, the upper and lower Durbin 
Watson bounds from Savin and White at a 1% Confidence Interval are also quoted in the above table. Test 
Statistic values above the upper bound result in the null hypothesis not being rejected and hence, no positive 
serial correlation is present. A test statistic below the lower bound results in the assumption that positive serial 
correlation is present and a test statistic within the bounds results in an inconclusive result.  Statistical test results 





L.5. Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity: 
Table L5 - Results for Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity           
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i             
  Observations Statistic P-Value   Observations Statistic P-Value 
Latin Panel       The UK       
I 347 321.92 0.0000 I 70 0.00 1 
II 347 936.76 0.0000 II 71 0.00 1 
III 272 81.27 0.0000 III 71 0.00 1 
EU Panel       Japan       
I 1695 8.60E+06 0.0000 I 58 0.00 1 
II 1723 1.80E+05 0.0000 II 58 0.00 1 
III 1674 15554.62 0.0000 III 58 0.00 1 
Full Sample       Portugal       
I 2100 35000000 0.0000 I 62 0.00 1 
II 2128 3.20E+07 0.0000 II 62 0.00 1 
III 2004 13429.18 0.0000 III 62 0.00 1 
Note: Modified Wald Test for Heteroskedasticity results based on: Ho: No Heteroskedasticity present and Ha: 
Heteroskedasticity present. The results of a Chi-squared test are presented in the above table with both the 
Test Statistic as well as the p-value being quoted. The absence of heteroskedasticity is rejected for the cases 
where the p-value < 0.1.  Statistical test results based on regression equations with sum of the macroprudential 
policy choices included as the index value. 
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4.8. Appendix M 
M.1. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
Instrumental Variable 
Table M1 focuses on the sum of macroprudential policy choices and the value of the 
macroprudential policy choice index is therefore indicative thereof.  An instrumental variable 
(Regulatory Quality) is included to account for any measurement error, omitted variable bias 
or simultaneity bias that may occur due to the endogeneity of the macroprudential policy tool 
index. The coefficient on lagged credit growth is positive and statistically significant for the 
first regression in the case of the Latin American panel and Japan, in the remaining cases the 
sign is positive with the exception of the negative sign in the case of Portugal.  The coefficient 
on lagged GDP growth is positive and statistically significant for the second regression for the 
cases of the EU panel, the Latin American panel, Japan and Portugal while, in the case of the 
full sample, the sign is negative.  Further, the coefficient on lagged inflation growth is positive 
and statistically significant in the all cases except that of the UK.  In the remaining cases, the 
sign is positive with the exception of the first regression for the case of Portugal, the second 
regression for the full sample and the third regression for the case of the UK.  When considering 
the full sample for the third regression, the coefficient on the macroprudential index is positive 
and statistically significant implying that a tighter macroprudential stance generally results in 
higher inflation when looking at the full sample. 
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Table M1 - Regression Results for Sum of Macroprudential Policy Changes with 
Instrumental Variable 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   




4.9. Appendix N 
N.1. Policy Instruments  
Table N1 - Summary of Various Macroprudential Policy Instruments 
 
Source: Alam et al. (2019) 
Note: * indicates that subcategories are available and included in the iMaPP Database. 
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N.2. iMaPP Database and Other Existing Databases 
Table N2 - Summary of Data Sources and Coverage of the iMaPP Database, constituting 
Databases as well as Other Macroprudential Databases 
 
Source: Alam et al. (2019) 
Note (As Defined by Alam et al. 2019):  
1.) The classification of instruments differs across databases. The column "Instruments" shows the number 
of categories, including subcategories, available in each dataset, without standardizing classification.  
2.)  "T/L indexes" is the dummy-type indexes for tightening and loosening actions of macroprudential 
policy measures.   
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4.10. Appendix O 
O.1. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with No 
Corrections 
Table O1 - Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
No Corrections 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   






O.2. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
Correction for Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
Table O2 - Results of Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy 
Choices with Correction for Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   





O.3. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
Dummy for Post Crisis Period 
Table O3 - Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with 
Dummy for Post Crisis Period 
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   






O.4. Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy Choices with Serial 
Correlation Correction Included (xtregar) 
Table O4 - Results of Additional Regression Results: Sum of Macroprudential Policy 
Choices with Serial Correlation Correction Included (xtregar)
 
Note: The R2 value quoted is the adjusted R2 value, the p-value quoted is associated with an F-test.  The value 
quoted for each variable is the coefficient value with the value in parenthesis being the standard error.   
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The number of studies aimed at analysing the impact of macroprudential policy tool 
implementation sky-rocketed in the aftermath of the GFC as policy makers realised that global 
financial integration, global liquidity and global risk aversion are indeed major determinants of 
global financial cycles.  Crockett (2000) points out that macroprudential policy tools target the 
stability of the financial system as a whole with the aim of minimizing the macroeconomic 
costs associated with periods of financial distress whereas, microprudential policy tools focus 
on individual institutional risks.  Smets (2013) concludes that the primary objective of monetary 
policy should remain price stability while, financial stability should be included as an explicit 
objective of monetary policy.  Further, he concludes that macroprudential policy tools should 
be used to maintain financial stability and in times when this is not effective, monetary policy 
should be the default policy choice.  Bruno et al. (2015) note that the combination of 
macroprudential policy tool implementation and monetary policy is more efficacious than a 
policy framework that only includes macroprudential policy tools or monetary policy.  Bruno 
et al. (2015) note that the combination of macroprudential policy tool implementation and 
monetary policy is more efficacious than a policy framework that only includes 
macroprudential policy tools or monetary policy.  Effective information sharing is required to 
ensure the successful interaction of the two policy choices which in turn, protects both the 
independence and credibility of Central Banks.  The relationship between conventional 
monetary policy tools, CBI and more recently, macroprudential policy tools as well as the 
crucial need to study financial stability following the cataclysmic repercussions of the GFC  




paved the way for the work done in this thesis. 
 
The primary objective of this thesis was to analyse the relationship between both conventional 
monetary policy and unconventional monetary policy tools and financial stability.  To do this, 
I studied the impact of monetary policy tool implementation on three measures of financial 
stability namely, credit growth, the exchange rate and the stock market index.  I also studied 
the impact of monetary policy tool implementation on the industrial production index.  Using 
an SVAR model and impulse response functions, I studied the impact of policy rate shocks in 
both the short and long run on credit growth, the exchange rate, the level of the stock market 
index and the industrial production index.  The results show that an inverse relationship exists 
between the policy rate and the stock market index for the cases of Colombia and the UK.  
Further, the results show that a positive policy rate shock results in an appreciation of the 
currency in both the short and the long run for the cases of Chile, Portugal and the UK while 
the currency depreciates for the cases of Colombia and Japan.  The results also show that the 
policy rate may be used to stabilise the real business cycle as an inverse relationship exists 
between the industrial production index and the policy rate for the cases of Colombia, Japan, 
Portugal and the UK.  Finally, an inverse relationship exists between credit supply and the 
policy rate for the cases of Chile, Japan and Portugal and hence, the policy rate may be an 
effective tool when abundant credit supply needs to be reined in.     
 
I went on to look at the institutional setting in the relevant countries, the Central Banks of these 
countries and both the political environment and financial stability of these countries over time 
and substantiated the discussion with an empirical analysis focusing on the impact of CBI on 
financial stability by using credit growth as a proxy for financial stability.  The main results 
show that a positive relationship exists between credit growth and the level of CBI due to the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between the growth in 
the level of domestic credit to the private sector and the level of the ECBI index for the cases 
of the UK and Portugal for the second regression equation and the interaction term between the 
growth in the level of domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions for the 
cases of Chile, Portugal and the UK for the second regression equation and the case of the UK 
for the third regression equation.  Higher levels of CBI are associated with higher levels of 
credit growth and hence, CBI would need to be reined in in times of credit abundance. 




I finally went on to look at unconventional monetary policy tools namely, macroprudential 
policy tools and their impact on three veins of financial stability during uncertain times.  The 
main results show that a tighter overall macroprudential policy tool stance would result in lower 
credit growth as well as lower GDP growth while, a tighter overall stance would result in higher 
inflation in the majority of cases.  Further, our results show that the level of capital openness 
plays a bigger role in Latin American countries, this makes intuitive sense as Latin American 
countries are more dependent on foreign capital inflows and developments in the exchange rate.  
Lastly, assets tend to flow into safer markets such as the EU in times of higher perceived market 
volatility (through the level of the VIX index).  This is confirmed by our results where a higher 
level of the VIX index leads to higher levels of GDP growth and lower levels of inflation in the 
EU panel whereas, in the other cases, higher levels of the VIX index result in higher inflation, 
higher credit growth and lower GDP growth.   
 
The results throughout this thesis focus on five individual country cases.  The five countries 
studied in this thesis have inflation targeting and independent Central Banks as well as floating 
exchange rate regimes.  Still, fundamental differences exist in the institutional setting, the 
political environment and the establishment and functioning of the Central Banks of these five 
countries.  Overall, both the results and policy recommendations should be analysed and made 
on an individual country basis instead of drawing aggregate conclusions.  The results show that 
conventional monetary policy tools may be effective when used in conjunction with alternative 
policy tools such as macroprudential policy tools.  Further, when considering the independence 
of Central Banks, policy makers should attempt to rein in CBI in times of abundant credit 
supply.  In summary, it is clear that the macroprudential stance of a country depends on both 
the geographic location as well as the choice of policy tools implemented as factors such as the 
influence of global market sentiment as well as capital openness play a fundamental role in the 
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